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Racism as “the Nation’s Crucial Sin”*:  Theology and Derrick Bell
George H. Taylor**
At the heart of Derrick Bell’s work lies a conundrum.  He argues that racism is 
permanent, and yet at the same time he insists that the struggle against racism remains 
worthwhile and valuable.  A number of critics find Bell’s thesis about racism’s permanence to be 
so despairing that, on its own terms, it renders any meaningful possibility of action against 
racism totally unavailing.1  My goal, by contrast, is to try to make sense of the paradox that lies 
so deep at the core of Bell’s work and thinking and assess how the possibilities of action can 
coexist with racism’s perdurance.  While a number of scholars in this post-civil rights era have 
turned to the social sciences to address why racism remains so persistent,2 I want to draw upon 
possible insights from theology.  Theological analysis may provide a separate source of insight 
into not only racism’s persistence but what Bell types its permanence.  And theology may 
illuminate how it is possible to acknowledge racism’s permanence and still engage in action 
against it.  My reference to theology takes the form of an analogy drawn from Christian 
theology, in particular from the work of the twentieth century American Protestant theologian, 
*DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 125 (1987) 
[hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED].  The phrase comes from a passage in one of Bell’s fictional 
chronicles and refers to a contention levied by the main protagonist in that chronicle, Ben Goldrich.  While this 
Article concentrates on Protestant theology, the boundaries of this theological inquiry are expanded when we realize 
that Bell describes Goldrich as Jewish.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A.; 
Ph.D. cand., University of Chicago.
1See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell’s Thesis of the Permanence of Racism 
and his Strategy of Confrontation, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 23, 24 (1995) (“Professor Bell’s work propagates a 
damaging and dampening message . . . .”); John A. Powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV.
533 (1992) (arguing that Bell’s thesis is “unsuccessful in avoiding despair”).
2See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of “Hate”:  Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of 
Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Helping Legal 
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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Reinhold Niebuhr.3  At the core of Niebuhr’s depiction of Christianity too lies a paradox:  sin is 
an inextricable structure of human life, and yet human action remains meaningful.  As in Bell, 
the paradox is not overcome; the paradox of the juxtaposition of sin and action is one that has 
challenged Christianity since its origins.  My claim is that the dynamics of the relation between 
sin and action may illuminate the dynamics of the relation between racism and action.
It is not necessary to my argument that racism be shown to be ontologically sinful, sinful 
as an actual, ultimate fact.  The argument therefore requires no belief in the reality of the 
Christian doctrine of sin, although many may believe racism is indeed sinful as that term is 
understood doctrinally.  My thesis is a more modest one:  there is a resonance between the 
depiction of sin and the depiction of racism, a resonance at the level of lived experience.  
Whatever the ultimate reality of sin, its characterization of the experience of human life usefully 
illuminates the experience of racism; it helps capture the reality of that experience.4  Further, the 
lived experience of what it means to understand sin and yet be able to act may usefully inform 
what it means to experience racism and yet also act.  To argue for a resonance between sin and 
3I will rely on Niebuhr’s principal theological work, The Nature and Destiny of Man, as well as an earlier 
major work, Moral Man and Immoral Society.  See 1-2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN
(1941; 1943) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN]; MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY
(1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY].  My analysis has benefitted from a most 
important new commentary on Niebuhr:  LANGDON GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR:  A THEOLOGICAL STUDY (2001).  One of 
the pleasures of my graduate education was the opportunity to attend Gilkey’s class lectures on Niebuhr.
As my research was ending, I came across the only other article of which I am aware that probes a similar 
interest in the relationship between Niebuhr and the persistence of racism thesis.  See Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 149 (Michael W. McConnell 
et al. eds., 2001).  While the present article, as the text goes on to discuss, considers the affinities between the 
paradoxes of sin and action and of racism and action, Davison’s attention lies in an element of that relationship:  the 
support Niebuhr provides to an understanding of why racism persists.  Davison concentrates more on Niebuhr’s 
social theory; I will elaborate more the details of Niebuhr’s theology.  Davison also discusses critical race theory in 
general, while my comments focus specifically on the work of Bell.  These differences in our attention do nothing, 
of course, to undermine my appreciation for Davison’s insight into the relevance of Niebuhr for understanding 
critical race theory. His thesis helped confirm that I too might be on the right track.
4To be more formal, the analysis is then phenomenological–the experience as lived–rather than 
ontological–the experience in its more ultimate reality.
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racism rather than some identity may as well be more true to Bell’s work.  As I will explore, 
Bell’s religious background and religious faith permeate his work and provide him a deep source 
of his resilience.5  This faith, which commentaries on Bell have not sufficiently assessed, seems a 
key element of Bell’s belief in the availability and merit of action despite racism’s permanence.  
So the resonance seems very strong between Bell’s call to action in the face of racism and the 
theological call to action in spite of sin.  And yet despite the prevalence of religious vocabulary 
in Bell’s writings, the topic of sin itself little appears, a topic I shall also probe.6  Hence the 
argument is one of the resonance between racism and sin rather than their identity, and my title is 
on theology and Derrick Bell rather than Derrick Bell’s theology, which would imply that the 
theology discussed here is necessarily Bell’s own.
Part I develops Bell’s thesis that racism is permanent, an ineradicable structure in 
American life.7  Bell’s stance here is unrelenting and a direct and deep challenge to liberal 
notions of racial progress.  This section draws out the social facts Bell provides about the status 
of blacks in American society8 and examines Bell’s argument for the continuing disparity 
5See infra text accompanying notes 277-96.
6Of special interest, of course, are those points where Bell uses the term “sin,” as in the passage referred to 
in this article’s title.  See infra note 298.
7Like Bell, I restrict analysis to racism in American life rather than speculate on the condition of racism 
more globally.
8Following Bell, I retain his primary emphasis on the divide between blacks and whites, rather than on the 
divides(s) between whites and other people of color.  Bell is certainly aware of the multiplicity of racial divides in 
this country.  See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 191 
(1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM] (discussing the internment of Japanese Americans during World 
War II).  He is also very much aware of the multiplicity of oppressions that individuals may undergo–“sexism, 
classism, homophobia, and other forms of oppressions”–and that, as “a good deal of the writing in critical race 
theory stresses . . . oppressions are neither neatly divorceable from one another nor amenable to strict 
categorization.”  Id. at 144-45.  See infra text accompanying notes 319-25 (developing Bell’s discussion of the 
divide between black men and black women).  Nevertheless, Bell’s predominant emphasis is on the divide between 
blacks and whites, and this Article replicates that emphasis.
As the Article will only begin to suggest, while a primary interest lies in developing the distinctive vantage 
point and insights that Bell offers, I am interested as well in what might be the distinctive vantage points, insights, 
and, indeed, theologies–see infra note 296–that might be offered by those of other racial backgrounds.  Richard 
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between the races, particularly the claim that whites hold on to a property in whiteness.  Part II 
analyzes Bell’s call for action despite racism’s permanence.  Part III develops Niebuhr’s 
theology of the possibility of action despite sin.  Niebuhr too criticizes the liberal–and liberal 
theological–belief in continuing progress; for Niebuhr, evil is not overcome.  Part IV returns to 
Bell and assesses his religious orientation and the degree it may be receptive to Niebuhr’s 
theology. Part of the assessment here will be whether Bell’s stance is more existential rather than 
theological.  Part V concludes by examining some of the larger implications of Bell’s thesis:  the 
continuation of deep structures that resist characterization simply as social constructions.  
Reference will be briefly drawn to the contributions of Bell and critical race theory to a 
movement beyond nonfoundationalism.9  Because the Article intends to offer additional grounds 
for the comprehension of Bell’s conundrum–that racism is permanent and yet must be 
continually fought–the goal is understanding, not criticism.  I hence assume Bell’s thesis 
throughout.
I.  The Problem:  Racism’s Permance
A.  Bell’s Thesis
Bell’s thesis is direct and searing:  “[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible 
component of this society.”10  This thesis of “the permanence of racism” is asserted as the 
Delgado, for instance, argues that one of the limitations of Bell’s analysis is, precisely, its “binary” emphasis on the 
divide between blacks and whites, an emphasis that limits attention to the possibilities of more polycentric, 
collaborative action between peoples of various colors.  See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit–Fit to 
Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 306-07 (2000).
9See infra text accompanying notes 374-83.
10BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xiii.
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subtitle of his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well11 and is reiterated in the title of several of 
his articles.12  In Faces at the Bottom of the Well,13 Bell’s attack is emphatic and unremitting:
– “[R]acism in America is not a curable aberration . . . .”  (x)
– “[R]acial problems . . . grow more intractable with time.”  (xii)
– “Black people will never gain full equality in this country.”  (12)
– “[R]acism is a permanent component of American life.”  (12)
– “[R]acism is a permanent part of the American landscape.”  (92)
– “[O]ppression on the basis of race returns time after time-in different guises, but it 
always returns.”  (97)
– [R]acism is permanent, the ultimate betrayal . . . .”  (108)
– “[R]acism lies at the center, not the periphery; in the permanent, not in the 
fleeting . . . .”  (198)
– “[W]hite society would never grant blacks a fair share of the nation’s benefits. . . .”  
(241).
– “[T]he common thread in all civil rights strategies is eventual failure.”  (248)
The message permeates Bell’s corpus.  While Brown14 mandated the end of state-sponsored 
segregation, no other decision is society “increasingly willing to commemorate, and less and less 
11See supra note 8.
12See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis:  Courageous Reveloation or Unconscious 
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 (1993) [hereinafter Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis]; 
Racism is Here to Stay:  Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79 (1991) [hereinafter Bell, Racism is Here to Stay].  Also hard-
hitting is the title of Bell’s book prior to FACES AT THE BOTTOM, see supra note 8, which is called AND WE ARE 
NOT SAVED.  See supra note *.  The title refers to a lament from Jeremiah:  “The Harvest is past, the summer is 
ended, and we are not saved.”  Id. at 241.  Yet while this lament highlights that racial justice has not occurred, a 
point distressing enough in itself, the tenor at this time in Bell’s writing is not necessarily that racial justice will 
never occur.
13In the succeeding quotations, citations are provided in the text.
14Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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willing to follow.”15  The song “We Shall Overcome” remains a civil rights anthem, but “the 
contrary teachings of racial history, combined with the ever-more troubling realities of the 
present, now intrude every more rudely and insistently on the dream.”16  The repeated force of 
Bell’s thesis pummels and washes over the reader with the intensity of an insistent stream.
The severity of Bell’s indictment is perhaps most keenly reflected in his fictional 
chronicle, The Space Traders,17 Bell’s best-known18 fable.  There Bell offers the story of alien 
visitors to the United States who promise the country wealth, environmental decontaminants, and 
alternatives to fossil fuel.  The gifts will assure the country’s prosperity for the foreseeable 
future.  There is only one catch.  In return for the gifts, the space traders want to take home all of 
this country’s blacks.  After significant debate, the nation votes conclusively for the trade.  The 
country does not decide on the basis of what is moral or right but on the basis of protection of 
white self-interest.  Racism is so powerful and abiding a motivation that it overcomes resistance 
to a vote approving a deep injustice.  Bell reports that significant majorities in his lecture 
audiences agree that were such a vote actually to be taken, the result would agree with that in the 
fable.19  And a number of blacks have related to Bell that were the choice made available to 
them, they would choose to go.  “Knowing what they know, they say, ‘Better risk the unknown 
15DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 49 (1998) [hereinafter BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES].  See 
also id. at 133 (“Because the mesh of racism is so woven into the nation’s essential fabric, I am convinced we can 
never eradicate it.”); id. at 134 (“[E]ven those gains we consider rock-solid can be taken away in a moment.”).
16Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 572.  See also id. at 573 (“[R]acism is an 
integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.”).
17See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158-94.
18See Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 902 (so stating) 
[hereinafter Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?].
19Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone:  Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 393, 405 (1990).  Admittedly, Bell’s audiences are self-selective, but it is not clear how that cuts.  Are they 
predisposed to be sympathetic to Bell’s arguments, or are they predisposed in favor of a belief in racial progress?  
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in space than face the certainty of racial discrimination here at home.’”20  The trade presented in 
the fable is unsettling precisely because it is not so fantastical as it might first appear.21
B.  The Evidence
Bell’s thesis is undeniably forceful, but what evidence does Bell provide in support?  
Does Bell simply dismiss the changes in the laws and behaviors affecting blacks?  It is most 
significant for comprehension of the deep substance of his thesis that he does not.  He 
acknowledges “[t]angible progress,”22 particularly the removal of formal barriers that maintained 
segregation.  We no longer see signs assigning public facilities by race.23  Millions of blacks are 
registered to vote and do vote.  Nationally, several thousand blacks have been elected to public 
The racial composition of his audience may play a factor in this determination, but even here the correspondence is 
not uniform.
20DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS:  PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME 32 (1996) 
[hereinafter BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS].  The statement occurs in the context of another of Bell’s fables, but the 
inference is that the statement is factual.  In the original Space Trader fable, Bell has a character argue during the 
convocation of “The Anti-Trade Coalition”:  “Outside civil rights gatherings like this, the masses of black people–
those you claim to represent but to whom you seldom listen–are mostly resigned to the nation’s acceptance of the 
Space Trader’ offer.  For them, liberal optimism is smothered by their life experience.”  BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 174.
21See Derrick Bell, Black History and America’s Future, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (1995) 
[hereinafter Bell, Black History and America’s Future].  Other commentators argue that the space trade is not at all 
fantastic but instead replicative of actual events in American history.  See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles,
My Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Law:  The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 425, 429 (1990) (“Not only have Blacks been enslaved, as the Chronicles sorrowfully notes, but other racial 
groups have been conquered and removed, imported for their labor and not allowed to participate in the society they 
built, or expelled when their labor was no longer considered necessary.”) (citing the Cherokee removal from 
Georgia, the importation of Chinese workers and then the Chinese Exclusion laws, and the importation of Mexican 
laborers under the Bracero Program, id. at 430-39); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of 
the Space Traders:  Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 321, 
323-24 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle] (same); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell 
and the Ideology of Racial Reform:  Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 941 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, 
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform] (discussing the removal of Japanese Americans during World War 
II).  In the context of his fable, Bell also discusses the removal of Japanese Americans during this war.  See BELL, 
FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 191.
22BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 5.  See also id. at 73 (“Much has changed.”); BELL, 
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 165 (“Even the most determined pessimist must acknowledge the change 
in the racial landscape in the last century.”).
23BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 5-6; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 
170, 45.
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office.24  These are changes that “seemed at one time impossible to achieve.”25
And yet . . . .  How deep-seated are these changes?  To what degree are they fundamental 
rather than at the surface?26  Has the structure of racism altered?  Bell recognizes progress, and 
yet, he insists, “nothing has changed.”27
What does Bell mean?  His response occurs at two levels.  First, despite the entrance of 
certain blacks to the middle and professional classes,28 the actual economic plight of blacks as a 
class is no better than it was and may be worse.  Second, the structure of racism persists.  As to 
the first, the figures are dire:  black unemployment has been twice that of whites; black income 
has been a little over half that of whites; joblessness has ravaged not only individuals but their 
families and their larger communities;29 one-third of young black men are either in prison or in 
the hands of the criminal justice system;30 more black men are in prison than in college.31
Brown’s32 promise of integrated education remains unfulfilled.33  Schools are now more 
segregated than they were three decades ago.34  The courts are increasingly resistant to claims for 
24Id. at 92.
25Id. at 232.
26See, e.g., id. at 93 (discussing that changes such as increases in black voting “are more cosmetic than 
real”).
27BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 22.
28Bell will argue that these individual advances in fact have relieved societal pressure for the advance of 
blacks as a class.  See infra text accompanying notes 59-60 & note 59.
29See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 5.  For an earlier statistical picture, see BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 45-48.
30See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 15.
31See id. at 150.  See also id. at 151 (“black men are suffering a genocide-like demise from the work-force, 
from the family and, increasingly, from life itself”).
32Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 162.
34See Greg Winter, Schools Resegregate, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at A14 (citing a new 
study by Harvard’s Civil Rights Project).  See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
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racial redress.35  In Bell’s view, “we must acknowledge that many, perhaps a majority of black 
children are in worse shape today than at any time since the end of Reconstruction, perhaps since 
the end of slavery.”36
These facts demonstrate the failures of change.  Why then is it that for African-Americans 
“nothing has changed”?37  For Bell, the grave facts are not the legacy of slavery or evidence of 
some “intrinsic weakness” in blacks themselves; rather, they are integral to a social system 
where the subordination of blacks serves as a source of protection for the identity and social 
stability of whites.  The permanence of racism thesis recognizes racism’s “deepest roots.”38
Racism is not a lingering vestige of a historical past; it is a present, ongoing system of 
subordination.
Bell has come to identify this continuing system and structure of racism as dependent on 
the effects of a property right in whiteness.39  The property right in whiteness asserts an 
dissenting) (observing that “[n]eighborhoods and schools remain racially divided” and citing, among other evidence, 
the Harvard study.  (Id. at 2443 n.4.)).
35See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 59.
36Derrick Bell, Public Education for Black Children:  A Future Role for Dramatic Crisis, in QUALITY 
EDUCATION FOR ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE? 25, 30 (1994) [hereinafter Bell, 
Public Education for Black Children].
37See supra note 27.
38BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 12.
39To my knowledge, Bell first proposed the concept in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, which dates to 1987.  See 
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 172.  Cheryl Harris later independently developed the concept, see 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1713 n.9 (1993) (noting her separate generation 
of the idea), and in his own presentation of the concept, Bell makes frequent reference to Harris.  See, e.g., BELL, 
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 175 n.3, 182 n.7; CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:  REFLECTIONS OF AN 
ARDENT PROTESTER 75 n.5 (1994) [hereinafter BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY]; Derrick Bell, Love’s Labor Lost?  
Why Racial Fairness is a Threat to Many White Americans, in Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Who’s Qualified 42, 
46-47 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Love’s Labor Lost]; Derrick Bell, Racism:  A Major Source of Property and Wealth 
Inequality in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Racism]; Derrick Bell, Wanted:  A 
White Leader Able to Free Whites of Racism, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 536 (2000) [hereinafter Bell, Wanted:  A 
White Leader]; Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education:  Forty-Five Years After the Fact, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV.
171, 176 n.13 (2000); Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 904-5; Derrick Bell & Linda 
Singer, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265, 270 n.21 (1993).
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entitlement of priority, preference, and privilege over blacks.40  “[T]he set of assumptions, 
privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of being white can become a valuable asset 
that whites seek to protect.”41  The advantages are economic, political, and psychological,42 and 
they accrue to every white whether he or she seeks it or not.43  Whiteness provides an underlying 
sense of individual and group identity; whites “bond” on the basis of race.44  A property in 
whiteness offers a vested right in a superior status.45  Blacks, by contrast, have a caste-like lower 
status; they are different, less worthy.46
Whites deal with racial issues by ultimately protecting their property right in whiteness:  
they act not out of altruism or morality but in self-interest.47  If white interests conflict with racial 
justice, white self-interest prevails.48  As Bell has argued since at least 1980, racial change occurs 
only as a matter of “interest convergence”:  “The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality 
will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”49  This is true even 
In earlier work such as AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, Bell also uses a somewhat different vocabulary to 
describe whiteness, appropriating Manning Marable’s concept of the “‘ideological hegemony’ of white racism.”  
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 156 (quoting Marable).
40See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 9, 55.
41Derrick Bell, [Dissenting Opinion], in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 
188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bell, Dissenting Opinion].
42Id. at 185.
43BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 13.
44Bell, Wanted:  A White Leader, supra note 39, at 540 (citing bell hooks).  See also BELL, FACES AT THE 
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 155 (“all whites are bonded–as bell hooks says–by racism”) (emphasis added).
45See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 137.
46Id. at 95.
47See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 
1611-12 (1988) [hereinafter Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival] (“racial reforms in law reflect less a late-
blooming civic virtue than perceived changes in self-interest . . . .”).
48Bell, Love’s Labor Lost, supra note 39, at 44.
49Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 523 (1980).  See also BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 53 (“blacks gain little protection 
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in such heralded decisions as Brown.50  There, for instance, protection of the United States’ 
image abroad during the cold war was vital to the arguments in favor of the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate holding.51  The Brown decisions also reflects a second element of Bell’s interest-
convergence thesis:  not only is a court’s holding dependent on white self-interest, but so is its 
enforcement.  Brown II’s holding that redress of segregated education should proceed not 
necessarily immediately but with “all deliberate speed”52 is, says Bell, an “unprecedented 
deferral of a recognized constitutional right.”53  Further, not only is the courts’ enforcement at 
stake because of white self-interest; so also does this self-interest spawn white resistance to the 
courts’ original holdings.54  Civil rights litigation has placed too much emphasis on winning a 
case and too little on its actual impact.55  Even if a case is won, its goals will be ignored, 
circumvented, or negated if they challenge existing claims of white entitlement.56  “[T]he 
traditions of racial subordination are deeper than the legal sanctions.”57  Any reforms that arise as 
against one or another form of racial discrimination unless granting blacks a measure of relief will serve some 
interest of importance to whites”). 
50Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 116-19 (citing, among other authorities, Mary L. 
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988)).
52Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
53BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 118.
54See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 108 (“If [a] self-interest approach is a valid 
explanation for the change in constitutional interpretation . . . then why wouldn’t the same self-interest have to be 
present before that decision could be implemented?”).
55Id. at 54.  Of additional interest here in Bell’s attention to implementation is his appropriation–for his 
more progressive purposes–of analyses drawn from law and economics, a field stereotypically viewed to be 
conservative or libertarian.  The most direct evidence of this appropriation arises in Bell’s narrative, The Racial 
Preference Licensing Act, see BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 47-64, where Bell creates a fictional 
scheme to tax enterprises that choose to remain discriminatory.  See id. at 54 n.* (citing the work of law and 
economics scholars Richard Posner and John J. Donohue).
56See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 53 (ignored); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, 
at 248 (circumvented); Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 186 (negated).
57BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 191-92.
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a result of civil rights litigation must cohere with white self-interest.58  Even though some 
individual blacks may have advanced due to the abandonment of formal barriers, these advances 
may actually serve more general white interests.  These advances ironically serve to enhance 
rather than undermine social stability.59  They serve as “proof” that racism is no more, is dead.60
“[P]rogress in American race relations is largely a mirage, obscuring the fact that whites 
continue, consciously or unconsciously, to do all in their power to ensure their dominion and 
maintain their control.”61
Part of Bell’s great frustration and deep disappointment is that his interest-convergence 
thesis suggests that whites low on the economic ladder might have sought alliance with blacks in 
similar conditions.  That, however, has not occurred.62  Rather than recognize and work together 
with similarly situated blacks to redress the commonality of their plight, whites at the economic 
bottom identify with whites at the economic top and blame blacks of a class similar to their own 
as the source of their problem.63  There is no greater sign of the power of whiteness as a property 
58See id. at 63.
59BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 48.  See also id. at 131-32 (“Instead of gaining access to 
real influence, it is more likely that we [blacks who have gained some stature] are legitimizing a system that 
relegates us to an ineffectual but decorative fringe.”).
60BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 48.
61Id. at 159.
62Bell explores this theme in his fictional narrative, The Chronicle of the Amber Cloud.  See BELL, AND WE 
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 162-65.  In this Chronicle, the amber cloud’s descent caused wealthy white 
adolescents to be stricken with the personality of poverty-ridden youth (e.g., lethargy, withdrawal, insecurity).  An 
expensive cure was developed that the nation was willing to pay.  But when the request came for nonwhite youths 
also to be treated, the nation refused.  As Bell relates, this Chronicle “undermined [his] theory that progress for 
blacks might evolve out of a national crisis endangering whites as well as blacks.”  Id. at 165.
63See Bell, Racism, supra note 39, at 1270-71.  See also Derrick Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1691, 1693 (1995) (claiming that the goal of racism is “to divide and alienate along racial lines those similarly 
subordinated as a means of maintaining the economic and political advantages held by well-off whites”).
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right.  Whites not at the economic top act against their best interests.64  Because of their racial 
bond, they place themselves “‘in the dominant circle–an area in which most hold no real power, 
but only their privileged racial identity.’”65  Whiteness as a property right is an essential element 
of American social stability.
The barriers to moving beyond reliance on an out group for social stability are 
monumental in a nation where whites of widely divergent stations are able to 
make common cause through their unspoken pact to keep blacks on the bottom.  
No other aspect of social functioning has retained its viability and its value to 
general stability from the very beginning of the American experience down to the 
present day.  Because of this fixation, I agree with Professor Jennifer 
Hochschild’s assessment that racism is not an anomaly, but a crucial component 
of liberal democracy in this country.  The two are historically, even inherently 
reinforcing.  In effect, the apparent anomaly is an actual symbiosis.66
The progress of blacks in the courts and in society has not advanced but been stymied.  
Bell’s work directly challenge two liberal beliefs:  first, that society (and the courts) progress in 
64BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 8.  See also BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra 
note *, at 254 (“The stark truth is that whites as well as blacks are being exploited, deceived, and betrayed by those 
in power.”); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, in REASON AND PASSION:  JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING 
INFLUENCE 199, 206 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect] 
(arguing that Justice Brennan’s judicial opinions maintain that “[t]he constitutional rights that black people seek are 
also the rights a great many white people need.  His labors sought to illuminate this obvious truth in the face of its 
rejection by so many whites who fear that racial equality would diminish rather than enrich their lives.”).
65BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1380-81 
(1988)).
66Bell, Racism, supra note 39, at 1270 (citing JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA:  
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984)).  See also Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, 
at 88-89 (“[W]e must address the reality that we live in a society in which racism has been internalized and 
institutionalized to the point of being an essential and inherently functioning component of that society–a culture 
from whose inception racial discrimination has been a regulating force for maintaining stability and growth and for 
maximizing other cultural values.”).
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an inherent, evolutionary direction toward equality,67 and second, that education–education about 
the plight of African-Americans–leads to change.68  The evidence that Bell adduces demonstrates 
that the belief in evolutionary racial advance is but “naive belief.”69  It is a belief that the 
evidence contests and refutes.  And the character of whiteness as a property interest has proven 
resistant to racial education:  the pull of racial self-interest, bond, and power has been too strong.  
“[V]iewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and power–all of which are generally 
known but never acknowledged–may explain why educational programs [about race] are 
destined to fail.”70
Racism is permanent.  The progresses that have been achieved–the ending of formal 
racial barriers, the advances of certain individual blacks in education and in material and social 
condition–were expected to signal racism’s end, but they have not.  Instead, they have exposed 
beneath this surface “a more sophisticated and more invidious vehicle for maintaining white 
67See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 47.  Sociologist Karl Mannheim described the 
liberal humanitarian utopian view as “the belief that reality moves continually towards an ever closer approximation 
to the rational,” a belief that “sees the world moving in the direction of a realization of its [liberal] aims.”  KARL 
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 223, 224 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936) (Harvest ed.).
68See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150, describing:
our long-held belief [that] education is the key to the race problem.  You know . . . education leads 
to enlightenment.  Enlightenment opens the way to empathy.  Empathy foreshadows reform.  In 
other words, that whites–once given a true understanding of the evils of race discrimination, once 
able to feel how it harms blacks–would find it easy, or easier, to give up racism.
For Mannheim, the liberal humanitarian utopia focuses on the power of the idea and its experience through 
education.  See MANNHEIM, supra note 67, at 219, 228.  The belief in education as a tool of reform is of course one 
shared by many who make education their profession. 
69BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 134.
70BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 155.  In an article published in 2000 entitled Wanted:  A 
White, see supra note 39, Bell repeats the language quoted to explain why the title’s plea will not be satisfied:  
“[V]iewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and power, all of which are generally known but never 
acknowledged, may explain why educational programs undertaken by the leader I seek are destined to fail.”  Id. at 
540.
15
dominance.”71  Even as many of “the exposed tentacles of the evil we fought” have been lopped 
off, “the true evil, the deeply felt need of so many whites to maintain priority status over blacks, 
[has] manifest[ed] itself in a myriad of new forms.”72  Bell discusses racism as akin to a 
gyroscope.  Individual advances may occur, but the gyroscope always returns to its initial 
equilibrium.  Our society, says Bell, is the “motivating force” of the gyroscope’s movement, 
even as it seems “to operate by an internal energy source.”73  Bell invokes Bartok’s opera, 
Bluebeard’s Castle,74 as a metaphor for the hazards facing American blacks.75  In the story, 
Judith marries Bluebeard and hopes to humanize him. She beseeches Bluebeard to let sunlight 
into his dark home, but he refuses.  Because of her efforts to open up his home, he ends up 
locking her away.76  In Bluebeard’s protection of his dominance and domain, Bluebeard’s 
response to Judith is similar to American society’s to its blacks:  “Nothing can enlight this 
castle.”77
II.  The Possibilities of Action
As Bell is only too aware, his indictment that racism is permanent can have a shattering 
impact on readers and listeners who had hoped for racism’s end.  “If racism is permanent,” he is 
71BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 128.  See also Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the 
Search for the Promised Land, 76 GEO. L.J. 229, 233 (1987) (“[T]oppling rigid racial barriers may have been a 
prerequisite to recognizing that economic inequality is the most virulent ingredient of racism.”).
72Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, supra note 64, at 199.
73BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 58.  Later in this work, Bell’s invokes parallel imagery 
as he appraises a “racial history that changes form but never alters its racial advantage for whites.”  Id. at 168.
74See Bela Bartok, Bluebeard’s Castle, COLUMBIA RECORDS recording 1963, MS 6425.
75See Derrick Bell, Bluebeard’s Castle:  An American Fairy Tale, in BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra 
note 15, at 155-68.
76See id. at 155-57.
77Id. at 159.
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asked, “then isn’t struggle hopeless?”78  How persist, how act when Bell’s message appears to be 
one, as he himself writes, of “futility and defeat,”79 “bleakness,”80 and “despair,”81 a 
“revelation[] of distilled woe?”82  This is the conundrum at the heart of Bell’s work and of this 
Article.  Bell insists that racism is permanent, and at the same time he also insists “that 
something must be done, that action must be taken,”83 that the fight against racism must continue 
to be waged.84  How is action possible?
A.  The Virtues of Necessity
As an initial matter, Bell’s thesis of racism’s permanence has the effect of an acid bath:  it 
cleanses, it reveals the truth.  An essential element of Bell’s effort is “to make people see,”85
make them “see the racial world as it is.”86  His work describes; it describes what society has 
done and, given the structure of racism, it is likely to do.87  Bell’s posture here reminds me of 
78BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xi.
79BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 248.
80Id. at 249.
81Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 91.
82BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 114.  Bell acknowledges as well that critics have called his 
work “unremittingly despairing.”  See id. at xi.
83Id. at 199.
84See Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 91.  The challenge is one that Bell continually puts to 
himself.  See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 4 (“My immediate challenge [in writing this book] was 
to transform this evidence of our increasingly dire plight into a written warning, one sufficiently clear to challenge 
us to action, but not so devastating as to encourage denial or suggest surrender.”).
85BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 60.
86Id. at 62.  As Bell acknowledges, this truth-telling resonates with the role of an Old Testament prophet.  
See, e.g., id. at ix.
87See id. See also id. at x (“[M]y conclusions about racism are less radical revelation than disquieting 
disclosure of what many know about the real roots of racism and prefer not to acknowledge.”); Derrick Bell, Racial 
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism] (“I speak here not of some new 
prophetic revelation.  Rather, these are frequently stated, yet seldom acknowledged truths that we continue to ignore 
at our peril.”).  Although the last statement indicates some distance of Bell from the prophetic, perhaps the 
resonance recurs here in the prophet’s disclosure of what humans, if attentive, should already have known.
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what philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls “the destructive hermeneutic,”88 the destructive method of 
analysis and interpretation.  The task is one of demystification;89 the false idols must be broken.90
The core of the method, though, is not skepticism but recognition of necessity.91  “The positive 
benefit,” writes Ricoeur, “of the ascesis required by a reductive and destructive interpretation [is] 
confrontation with bare reality, the discipline . . . of necessity.”92  The corrosive bath of Bell’s 
thesis of racism’s permanence lays reality bare; it strips away our illusions.  To lay reality bare is 
a virtue unto itself.  We now know and must acknowledge with what we are faced.93
But this virtue of necessity is only one part of its value.  Once we sweep away the debris 
of the false idols, we can also assess what it may be possible yet to affirm.  “Destruction . . . is a 
moment of every new foundation.”94  Confrontation with necessity is salutary.  As Bell writes, 
“[W]e risk despair as the necessary price of much-needed enlightenment.  Facing up to the real 
world is the essential prerequisite for a renewed vision, and for a renewed commitment to 
88PAUL RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 237 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978) 
[hereinafter RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR].  More famously, Ricoeur calls this the hermeneutics of 
suspicion.  See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY:  AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 33-35 (Denis Savage 
trans., 1970) [hereinafter RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY].
89 See id. at 34.  In another vocabulary, the move here can be called deconstructive.  See, e.g., POWELL, 
supra note 1, at 535 (“It is when Bell is deconstructing formal equality and rights rhetoric that his arguments are 
most persuasive.”).
90See RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at 27.
91See RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 88, at 237.
92RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at 35 (emphasis added).
93See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 92 (“At the least . . . , understanding the true nature of 
racism would equip us to weather its myriad harms.”).  In a question and answer session following a lecture, Bell 
analogizes the experience of racism with that of alcoholism:
Alcoholics survive precisely because they acknowledge that their disease is permanent, and that 
they must not only recognize it, they have to almost hail it, you see, in order to get past it.  I think 
that is what we must do with racism.  Because there is the potential, once you acknowledge how 
bad it is, not to accept it and to determine that you are going to do whatever you can . . . to oppose 
it.
Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 43 (question and answer session).
94RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at 33 (citing Heidegger).  See also id. at 27 (“It may be 
that extreme iconoclasm belongs to the restoration of meaning.”).
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struggle based on that vision.”95
B.  Action as Protest
Action that has faced the discipline of necessity takes three forms in Bell’s work and life.  
The first is action as protest.96  Action here recognizes reality–including the reality of racism–but 
challenges it, protests it, defies it, even as this action understands that it will likely end in defeat.  
“Our lives gain purpose and worth when we recognize and confront the evils we encounter–small 
as well as large–and meet them with a determination to take action even when we are all but 
certain that our efforts will fail.”97  The point of action as protest is not necessarily to win but to 
act with ethical integrity.98  The action–win or lose–has its own dignity.  The virtue comes in the 
very acts of engagement, commitment,99 and struggle.100  The action provides its own 
satisfaction,101 its own sense of affirmation102 and rightness.103  While the confrontation with 
reality may be despairing, the triumph comes in the continuation of the act, the maintenance of 
95BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xi. 
96The most well-known of Bell’s own acts of protest was, of course, his decision in 1990 to take a leave of 
absence from Harvard Law School until the school hired a woman of color to a permanent faculty position.  When 
two years had passed, the University required him, under University rules, to come back or lose his tenured position.  
Because the Law School hiring had not occurred, Bell refused.  The University in turn refused to modify its position 
and ended Bell’s Harvard career.  Bell now teaches at the New York University Law School.  See DERRICK BELL, 
ETHICAL AMBITION:  LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH 3-5 (2002) [hereinafter BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION] 
(recounting this protest).
97See id. at 177.
98See id. at 5 (“[M]y primary goal has been to live an ethical life . . . . that means I try to choose the ethical 
route even when defeat rather than success may wait at the end of the road.”).
99See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198 (citation omitted); Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, 
supra note 12, at 90 (same) (citation omitted).
100See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 135.
101See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 123.
102See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 81.
103See id. at 58.
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the struggle, the refusal to accede.104  “In effect, then,” Bell writes, “failure is inevitable, and 
there need be no failure.”105
Further, although the act as protest may not result in policy change, it may have other 
benefits in addition to those it has for the actor.  As the act calls others to account, it can expose 
the integrity or lack thereof of others’ actions; it can reveal hypocrisy.106  Just as Bell requires of 
himself and other sympathizers that they confront reality, so the act of protest challenges its 
opponents–usually unsuccessfully–to confront the reality of their own position.  More positively, 
protest may create a “magnetic field” that extends its power and influence beyond its original 
domain.107  Others may be inspired by the protest to take up the cause or similar causes;108
others, more modestly, may be moved to support those who engage in direct protest action.109
And the act may inspire others to act in the future and find succor in the lineage of those who 
have gone before.110
C.  Action as Racial Realism
The second form action takes in Bell’s work and life is as “racial realism.”111  A hallmark 
of racial realism is the claim that the fight against racism should pay less attention to ethics and 
104See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 161 (citing ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF 
SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Justin O’Brien trans. 1955) [Vintage ed.]) [hereinafter CAMUS, THE MYTH OF 
SISYPHYUS]).  In Part IV.A infra, I return to examine at greater length the existentialist character of Bell’s work.
105BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 164.
106See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 183.
107BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 130; id. at 120 (“protest generates a magnetic 
force”).
108See, e.g., id. at 71 (noting that his Harvard protest motivated some minority lawyers to pursue legal 
academic careers).
109See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting the continuing support he has received from various walks of life for his 
Harvard protest).
110See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 136-37 (noting the value to his own efforts of the 
example of his predecessors in the fight against racism).
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more to economics.112  Racial realism accepts the present reality of blacks’ subordinate status 
and argues that only economic change will provide redress to poverty, joblessness, and other 
similar ills.  The traditional civil rights view that law, through effectuation of racial equality, 
would lift blacks out of their economic condition has failed.113  The prototypical example of 
Bell’s realism is his long-standing resistance to Brown,114 its enforcement, and its continued 
advocacy by the civil rights community.  From at least 1976, Bell has consistently–and, 
obviously, quite controversially–insisted that the educational focus for blacks should not be on 
school integration but on quality education.115
Bell’s writings provide some quite provocative models of how economic change could 
occur.  Bell argues, for example, for recognition of “entitlement to basic needs–jobs, housing, 
health care, education, security in old age–as an essential property right of all.”116  Elsewhere, in 
his fictional narrative, The Racial Preference Licensing Act,117 Bell proposes a plan of “[r]acial 
realism” that “does not assume a nonexistent racial tolerance, but boldly proclaims its 
111See, e.g, Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, supra note 64; Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 87; Bell, 
Divining a Racial Realism Theory, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 89-108.
112Id. at 98.
113See Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 87, at 377-78.
114Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideal and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) [hereinafter BELL, SERVING TWO MASTERS]; Bell, Neither 
Separate Schools nor Mixed Schools, in BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 102-22 (quoting W.E.B. 
DuBois’s comment that “blacks need neither segregated schools nor mixed schools” but rather education, id. at 120) 
(citing W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in 2 THE SEVENTH SON:  THE THOUGHT AND 
WRITINGS OF W.E.B. DU BOIS 408 (J. Lester ed., 1971)); Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 187 (again 
citing Du Bois’s comment).
116Derrick Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past:  Getting Beyond the Civil Rights Decline, in RACE IN 
AMERICA 73, 81 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past].
117See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 47-64.
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commitment to racial justice through the working of a marketplace. . . .”118  Relying on work in 
law and economics,119 Bell’s plan provides that business establishments that wish to discriminate 
should be permitted to do so, but must pay a tax, and the tax would go to support black 
businesses and other efforts in the black community.120  In another story, Racial Royalties,121
Bell proposes that companies that draw on “African-American music, dance, dress and 
hairstyles, language, and so forth” would be charged a royalty fee that would be funneled into 
urban redevelopment.122
There is, of course, a certain self-admitted irony in Bell’s advocacy of these actions as 
racial “realism.”  On the one hand, they do act on the basis of economics, not ethical pleadings, 
and Bell is certainly quite emphatic that only economic acts will actually lead to the 
improvement of black social conditions.  The agenda within the black and civil rights 
communities must, he argues, come to reflect this change in attention.  And there is some 
possibility of economic action becoming effective on the basis of self-help,123 including 
organized protests and boycotts.124  But as Bell is also aware, his proposals will run into 
resistance, both from the civil rights community125 and from whites.126  Bell remains serious 
118Id. at 47.
119See id. at 54 n.*.
120See id. at 48-49.
121See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 141-51.
122See id. at 147-48.
123See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xii (“Coalition building is an enterprise with 
valuable potential as long as its pursuit does not obscure the basic fact:  nobody can free us but ourselves.”); Derrick 
A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814, 814 (1982) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights 
Lawyers] (“Nobody can free us but ourselves”).
124See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 53; Civil Rights Lawyers, supra note 123, at 
814.
125See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 54 (noting the civil rights community’s likely 
strenuous objection to the Racial Preference Licensing Act).
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about the goals of economic change, both on the basis of black self-help and the possibility–even 
if remote–of support from working-class whites.127  More generally, Bell’s efforts at racial 
realism are thought experiments that attempt both to raise the consciousness128 of his readers and 
listeners and to urge the movement beyond failed, traditional approaches and the examination of 
any possibilities whose potential can be exploited.129
D.  Action as Writing
These last reflections move us to the third form of action in Bell’s work and life, the 
action undertaken by his writings130 themselves.  If racism is permanent, is there any point to 
Bell’s labors to bring his writings before the public?  Doesn’t writing fail to maintain the 
discipline of necessity:  the recognition of racism as indeed permanent?  Doesn’t writing assume 
the liberal conceit that Bell otherwise seems to criticize:  that education will lead to 
enlightenment, enlightenment will lead to empathy, and empathy will lead to reform?131  In part, 
Bell’s response lies along lines already addressed:  that he must be true to himself and faithful to 
the truth of his message.  “We’re a race of Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation to 
126See, e.g., Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past, supra note 116, at 81 (noting resistance to the campaign 
for basic entitlements “from many whites who will be its principal beneficiaries of its success”).
127Analogizing to the efforts undertaken by Jesse Jackson in his run for the presidency, Bell advocates an 
educational campaign whereby “working-class whites [may be] willing to learn what blacks have long known:  that 
the rhetoric of freedom so freely voiced in this country is no substitute for the economic justice that has been so long 
denied to whites as well as blacks.”  Id.  As observed in the prior note, see supra note 126, Bell on the same page 
expresses awareness consistent with his understanding of whiteness as property, see Part I infra, that many white 
beneficiaries of his proposal will resist it.  In the text, I go on to suggest how Bell reconciles the “reality” of his 
proposal to the likelihood of his success.
128See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 62.
129See id. at 60.
130For present purposes, Bell’s lectures and other oral presentations should be understood to be included 
within the rubric of the not quite adequate term, his “writings.”
131BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150 (quoted previously at note 68 supra).
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repent.”132  In part, though, Bell also acknowledges–throughout his work–that his message may 
fail.  A few lines down from the sentence just quoted, Bell continues:  “About the least dire fate 
for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and 
nobody cares.”133  And even if the prophet has listeners, prophecy may lead not to conversion but 
to resistance.134  Elsewhere Bell recalls his late wife Jewel’s admonition that “trying to teach the 
white folks” was folly.135  Bell recognizes as well the quixotic character of fighting with words 
against structures of oppression and economic and political power.136
Yet there is a deeper purpose to Bell’s writings also, one that does not reject the 
limitations just raised but carves out its own space nevertheless.  This deeper purpose has three 
elements.  First, as with other writings of a comparable perspective, Bell’s stories can provide 
“understanding and reassurance” for those, such as many blacks, who have walked a similar 
path.137  Bell’s truth-telling is the telling of their stories.  These “counterstories” at the same time 
132BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 157.  Other commentators have typed some of Bell’s 
work a “jeremiad.”  See, e.g., Marcus Bruce, “The Promise of American Life”:  Derrick Bell, Critical Race Theory,
and the American Jeremiad, in FOLKWAYS AND LAW WAYS:  LAW IN AMERICAN STUDIES 165 (Helle Porsdam ed., 
2001) (discussing BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20); Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle, supra 
note 21, at 329 (claiming Bell’s chronicle, The Space Traders, in BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 
158-94, “is a classic Jeremiad–a tale aimed at making a powerful group aware of its own iniquitous history and 
potential for more of the same”).  Later we shall return to Bruce’s claim that the jeremiad, and Bell’s version of it, 
offers not simply condemnation but hope.  See infra note 145.
133BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 157.
134See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 33.  In another of his stories, Bell narrates the 
power of a minister’s sermon in music but her audience’s determination “not to be moved by it.”  BELL, GOSPEL 
CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 213.
135See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 148.  (The specific context is Bell’s protests 
rather than his writings.)  See also Bell, Trying to Teach the White Folks, in BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 
29-48 (fictional narrative); BELL, FACTS AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 135 (narrating the incredulous response of 
his fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, to his attempt to write an allegory that would shame whites into proper 
action).
136See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 35 (“[I]t sure is tough trying to resist 
oppression with words and ideas.”); id. at 33 (“[I]t’s hard to imagine how more of our writings [his and Geneva 
Crenshaw’s] can halt or even hinder the hostile forces arrayed against our people.”).
137Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory, supra note 18, at 910 (writing of the value of critical race 
writings more generally).
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contest majoritarian stories and “strike a chord” with the ready listener.138  The stories can 
provide a sense of “homeland” in readers’ minds and hearts.139  By contrast, for those readers, 
mainly white, who have not trod Bell’s path, Bell’s writings–particularly the fictional narratives–
serve a second function.  The narrative form invites readers to suspend judgment and belief, so 
that they may be more open to the reality of the views expressed,140 even as their prior reality is 
disrupted.141  The story may be revelatory:  both as an unmasking–you claimed to hold to the 
truth of equality but did not–and as the announcement of a new truth.142
Does the possibility of an announcement of a new “truth” conflict with Bell’s thesis that 
racism is permanent?  It may well, and at this crux we (and Bell) confront the deepest 
dimensions of the abiding paradox in his work:  that racism is permanent, but action is possible.  
At one level, Bell’s writings demand that we confront what is.  And yet at another level they 
open us to what may be.143  Racism is elemental to “what is,” but we do not know what “may 
be.”  Bell does not want to discard or escape his thesis of racism’s permanence, and yet he has 
hopes for the future.  This is an indissoluble tension.  Bell’s work has a “transformatively 
138Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Racial Realism:  A Commentary on White Optimism and Black Despair, 
24 CONN. L. REV. 527, 530 (1992).  Delgado continues:  “It is no accident that Bell has a tremendous underground 
circulation and status in the minority community of color.  We know that his message is true.”
139See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 172.  The sense of “homeland” also has a 
prospective quality, as I shall discuss below.  See infra text accompanying notes 143-49.
140See Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory, supra note 18, at 902.
141See id. at 899.
142See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 155.  Elsewhere I plan to develop this 
comment at much greater length.  See GEORGE H. TAYLOR, BELL’S NARRATIVES AS PARABLES (forthcoming).
143See Derrick Bell, 1995 Commencement Address–Howard University School of Law, 38 HOW. L.J. 463, 
470 [hereinafter Bell, Commencement Address] (expressing of the similarity between the artist and the protester that 
“the main creative urge” in both operates through “a medium that communicates a view of what is against a 
background of what might be”).
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aspirational concern.”144  His work is disruptive both to challenge what is and to open the way 
for what may be.145  He does not know what may be, but the disruption may spark revelation.146
He does not intend, for instance, for his fictional proposal of a racial preference licensing law to 
be enacted, but the shock generated by its perspective may cause an opening beyond traditional 
views.147  The shock may generate contemplation and exploration of new alternatives.148  Bell 
wants to open the way for new, real but yet unknown possibilities.149
E.  Action:  Not By Morality Alone
Revelation of new possibilities is necessary, but more than revelation is required if 
change is to be actual and effective.  New truths will be resisted.150  Here we return to Bell’s 
144Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Theory?, supra note 18, at 906 (discussing critical race theory in general).
145See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 4 (analogizing what he hopes to produce in his efforts to
those of gospel music, which has the potential “to touch and unite across barriers of race and class”).  Marcus Bruce 
describes Bell’s GOSPEL CHOIRS as a jeremiad that, like other jeremiads in American history, both engages in 
critique and calls for “a profound spiritual transformation of American society.”  Bruce, supra note 132, at 167.
146See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 167 (“[T]here is the potential for self-
revelation for whites as well as blacks.”); id. at 167 (speaking of “the door of racial revelation”).
147See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 60.
148See id. at 62.
149In the final pages of AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, Bell offers a more optimistic conclusion than the prior 
despairing narratives would suggest.  See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 248-58.  These pages 
have received significant criticism.  See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Racism and Legal Doctrine, 67 TEX. L. REV. 417, 
428 (1988) (criticizing that Bell here turns “wildly optimistic”); Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial 
Reform, supra note 21, at 927 (“The gap between the bleak picture painted in the first part of the book and the rosy 
ending is puzzling.”).  Yet Bell’s stance there can be retrieved consistent with this larger emphasis in his work.  
What is most important about the passage is not its specific remedies, which the weight of prior pages would suggest 
are unworkable, but the call for a “Third Way” (between black emigration and violent struggle).  The “Third Way” 
calls for another route, some new future.  As Bell admits, this appeal is “utopian,” but the point is to proceed beyond 
failed options to something else that is as yet “difficult even to envision.”   Id. at 255.  This form of utopia should be 
contrasted to utopia as escape.  See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 172 (contrasting his fictional 
Afrolantica, which is a “reflection” of the world, with Camelots and Shangri-las, which “all are envisioned as 
escapes from the real world”).  The contrast between utopia, in its best function, as “exploration of the possible” and 
utopia as escape, “the completely unrealizable,” is developed in PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND 
UTOPIA 310 (George H. Taylor ed., 1986).  Bell’s vision is utopian in the sense of “exploration of the possible.”
150See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 143 (“The presentation of truth in new forms 
provokes resistance, confounding those committed to accepted measures for determining the quality and validity of 
statements made and conclusions reached, and making it difficult for them to respond and adjudge what is 
acceptable.”).  See also Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 47, at 1620-21 (“[F]aith in the 
26
criticism of the liberal model–the assumed progression from education to enlightenment to 
empathy to reform.151  The appeal to morality–that change should occur because it is the right 
thing to do–is insufficient.152  In part Bell’s response here is due to his experience with the 
failure of “morals-policing” laws, including Brown.153  Compliance is not voluntary, and it is 
difficult to enforce.154  Recognition must be had that society acts on the basis of self-interest155
and power.156  Racial realism acknowledges that change will not occur “until blacks become 
insistent or . . . political or economic conditions dictate. . . .”157  Reliance on faith and hope is not 
enough; their fulfillment requires works.158  Over seventy years ago, the following statement 
appeared:
It is hopeless for the Negro to expect complete emancipation from the menial social and 
economic position into which the white man has forced him, merely by trusting in the 
moral sense of the white race. . . .  However large the number of individual white men 
who do and who will identify themselves completely with the Negro cause, the white 
intellectual solution may be as deserving of recognition as faith that our humanity will not always be subordinated 
because we are not white.”).
151BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150.
152In one fictional narrative, Bell has a character chastise himself for having done what he had often 
criticized civil rights representatives for doing:  “he had tried to get whites to do right by black people because it was 
right that they do so. . . . ‘Crazy!’ he humbled to himself, at himself.”  BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, 
at 171.
153Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
154See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 51.
155See, e.g., Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 47, at 1613 (expressing skepticism about 
“society’s willingness to act out of virtue rather than self-interest”).
156BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 171 (“[T]here seems no end to those who view power 
as license to abuse, sanction to exploit, invitation to demean.  Will a time ever come when those with power believe 
in and practice justice? . . . [B]oth history and our experiences support a pessimistic response.”).
157Id. at 167.
158See Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 37.  I return to the theme of the 
interrelation of faith and works in Part IV infra.
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race in America will not admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not forced to do so.  Upon 
that point one may speak with a dogmatism which all history justifies.159
As evident, the conclusion is one with which Bell agrees, and it is one that he has quoted 
favorably.160  The statement appeared in 1932 under the hand of American Protestant theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr.  As we seek more completely to understand Bell’s work, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether Niebuhr’s theology–and the paradox it maintains between the permanence of 
sin and the possibility of action–can inform our comprehension of Bell’s paradox–the 
permanence of racism and the possibility of action.
III.  Niebuhr’s Theology
Niebuhr’s major theological work was produced during the 1930’s and early 1940’s.161  It 
was written against the backdrop of–and responded to–the aftermath of World War I, the 
Depression, social and political unrest, and the sweep of history toward World War II.  In his 
important new book on Niebuhr,162 theologian Langdon Gilkey writes:
In a turbulent epoch when evil often appeared to be dominant, Niebuhr’s theology 
seemed to present the possibility of a social realism that maintained its moral 
nerve and did not become either cynical or despairing, even when self-interest 
appeared to rule everywhere.  Since the optimistic base for creative work for 
justice was now gone, the question was:  How is it possible to have hope and to 
159See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 252-53.
160BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 160.
161These books include Moral Man and Immoral Society, see supra note 3, published in 1932 and the two 
volumes of The Nature and Destiny of Man, see supra note 3, published, respectively, in 1941 and 1943.
162See GILKEY, supra note 3.
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maintain the struggle for justice in a world so filled with self-interest?163
Three elements of this appraisal deserve our attention.  First, already we sense a strong resonance 
between Niebuhr and Bell.  Although each writes in a different historical epoch, a similarity of 
themes predominates:  the perdurance of evil and self-interest and, regardless, the struggle for 
justice and the drive toward new possibilities, Niebuhr in the form of “social realism,” Bell as 
“racial realism.”  Second, as I now turn to discuss, Niebuhr’s theology is a political theology, 
and, third, as I will then turn to, it is a theology that–like Bell’s work–criticizes the liberal 
assumption of optimism and inherent progress.
A.  A Political Theology
Often the preoccupation of Christianity is viewed to be the individual:  his or her own 
individual sin, individual relation to God, and individual salvation in a life hereafter.164
Niebuhr’s focus is quite different.  His ruling concern as a Christian theologian is social
existence and historical meaning.165  For Niebuhr, “[t]he obligations that faith entails are those 
that mainly involve the creation of justice and love in our own historical communities;” the 
primary result of sin is not distance from God “but injustice toward the neighbor in historical 
time.”166  At the heart of his thought is a “passion for social justice and for historical renewal;” 
his theology’s aim is to provide “a foundation for creative action in the world.”167  Niebuhr’s is a 
163Id. at xi.
164See, e.g., id. at 204 n.3 (making the contrast).
165See id. at 20.  As Gilkey relates, Niebuhr also attends the individual dimension, but this is a less 





Like Bell’s fight against the prevailing liberal civil rights doctrine of his era, Niebuhr had 
to fight against the prevailing liberal theological and social doctrine of his.  Niebuhr, like Bell, 
contested what Niebuhr called the “modern optimism [in] a philosophy of history expressed in 
the idea of progress.”169  Liberal doctrine did not find evil a serious or persisting problem.170
Niebuhr, like Bell, argued that this optimism was seriously belied by the facts of the world 
around him.  Liberalism’s failure to attend the seriousness of evil also left it unable to function as 
a source of insight, understanding, or possible answer when the facticity and pervasiveness of 
evil could no longer be denied.171  Niebuhr’s theology intended to be more responsive, both to 
the existence of the problem of evil and to the ways it could be addressed.172  Against liberalism, 
Niebuhr revived the concept of sin to understand the nature of evil.  In a considerable 
168See id. at 20.
1691 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 24.  Niebuhr goes on to describe this 
philosophy as one relating historical process to the innate unfolding of a biological process.  Id.  In the opening 
pages of Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr’s criticism of liberalism is scorching:
Insofar as this treatise has a polemic interest it is directed against the moralists, both religious and 
secular, who imagine that the egoism of individuals is being progressively checked by the 
development of rationality or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill and that nothing but the 
continuance of this progress is necessary to establish social harmony between all the human 
societies and collectives.
NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at xii.  See also id. at xviii (“Most of the social 
scientists are such unqualified rationalists that they seem to imagine that men of power will immediately check their 
exactions and pretensions in society, as soon as they have been apprised by the social scientists that their actions and 
attitudes are anti-social.”).
170See, e.g., 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 23 (assessing that the “final 
certainty” of modern social theory “is its optimistic treatment of the problem of evil”).
171See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 78 (“[T]wentieth-century historical existence had challenged the liberal 
confidence in human rationality and morality and the liberal faith in historical progress, and had left as a 
consequence a vast spiritual vacuum.”).
172Davison Douglas observes that Niebuhr’s views here had a notable impact on the work of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.:  “Drawing on Niebuhr, King wrote in 1952 that liberalism ‘vainly seeks to overcome injustice 
through purely moral and rational suasions. . . .  Perfect justice will not come by a simple statement of the moral 
superiority of brotherhood in the world, for men are controlled by power, not mind alone.’”  Douglas, supra note 3, 
at 159 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr’s Ethical Dualism, 2 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 146 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1992)).
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transformation of classical doctrine, he reinterpreted the symbol of sin as relevant for social, not 
simply individual, life in order to make it pertinent to his world.173  Ironically, as we shall see, 
Niebuhr found that liberal doctrine had underestimated the dimensions not only of the “daemonic 
misuse” we may make of human freedom but of human freedom itself.174
B.  Sin
The doctrine of sin lies at the center of Niebuhr’s thought.175  For him, sin has two 
dimensions:  vertical and horizontal.176  The vertical dimension of sin consists of “man’s 
rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God.”177  Humans attempt to transmute 
their partial, finite values and selves into an ultimate good.178  Sin is manifested in the form of 
pride, self-love, self-righteousness.179  And it is manifested by humans universally.180  The 
lurking, continuing, and destructive presence of sin in all of human life181 is the testament of its 
depths and perdurance.  Sin is not isolated as the property of the most wicked but is 
everyone’s.182  As is well known, the complication for Niebuhr here–as for the history of 
173See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 23.
1741 NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 24.
175See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 102.
176See, e.g., 1 NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 226.
177Id. at 179.
178See id. at 122.
179See id. at 188 (pride, self-love); id. at 200 (self-righteousness).
180See id. at 242.
181See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 200.
182See id. at 109.  In his book on Niebuhr, Gilkey illustrates this universality of sin through the experiences 
he–Gilkey–underwent for two and a half years during World War II as a member of a Japanese civilian internment 
camp in China.  (He had been rounded up shortly after the beginning of the war while a teacher of English at a 
Chinese university.)  Although the circumstances at the camp were trying, they were not in the same universe as the 
horrors experienced in the German concentration camps.  For Gilkey, the real pathos were the sins of selfishness 
committed by camp residents (not the Japanese) over such issues as room reallocation.  The sins were shocking 
precisely because the issues were so modest.  See id. at 117-19.  For a more comprehensive account, see LANGDON 
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Christian doctrine–is how to explain that sin is universal without also concluding that it is 
ineluctable–part of our essential nature183–and therefore outside individual responsibility.184
Niebuhr argues that sin cannot be understood apart from human freedom.  “The essence of man 
is his freedom.  Sin is committed in that freedom.”185  Freedom is wrongly used.186  Sin is a 
defect in the will, and the will entails freedom; the defect lies in freedom, not in a destruction by 
sin of the human essence.187  Sin is universal but not necessary.188  Niebuhr acknowledges that 
the relation between freedom and sin remains paradoxical, something that “cannot be fully 
rationalized.”189  Also unexplained is why humans have this “bias toward sin,”190 why each 
individual succumbs.  The mystery of sin’s origins remains.191
Whatever our assessment of Niebuhr’s description of the vertical dimension of sin, we 
need to see its coordination with his understanding of sin’s horizontal dimension.  If sin’s 
vertical dimension of sin is the human effort to place oneself in the center, the horizontal 
GILKEY, SHANTUNG COMPOUND (1966).  When I attended Gilkey’s Niebuhr lectures, see supra note 3, the most 
memorable class was the day Gilkey recounted some of his camp experiences as part of his larger discussion of sin.  
Despite the passage of time, Gilkey’s description movingly displayed his continuing dismay and anger at his 
campmates’ behavior, behavior that still brought tears to his eyes.
183In part for this reason Niebuhr rejects any literalistic account of “original sin as an inherited taint” from 
Adam and Eve.  1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 260.  Niebuhr finds value in an 
originalist account only because of its “representative rather historical” character.  Id. at 261.  For Niebuhr, as 
Gilkey deftly phrases it, Adam and Eve are symbols, not causes, of the human condition.  GILKEY, supra note 3, at 
134.
1841 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 242.
185Id. at 17.  See also 2 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 80 (“Where there is 
history at all there is freedom; and where there is freedom there is sin.”).
1861 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 16.
187See id. at 242.  See also id. at 269 (“[S]in is a corruption of man’s true essence but not its destruction.”).
188See id. at 242.
189Id. at 262.
190Id. at 250.
191See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 234-35.
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dimension of sin–the “moral and social dimension”–is injustice.192  “The ego which falsely 
makes itself the centre [sic] of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably subordinates 
other life to its will and thus does injustice to other life.”193  Here Niebuhr’s theology as political 
comes to the fore.  Injustice is an “inevitable concomitant” of pride.194  The will-to-power is both 
a form and instrument of the pride that is “sin in its quintessential form.”195  Where there is 
unequal power, those in power will use whatever means needed to maintain it and will seek to 
justify those means as plausibly as they can.196  Self-righteousness is “responsible for our most 
serious cruelties, injustices and defamations” against our fellow humans, as the “whole history of 
racial, national, religious and other social struggles” shows.197  The self-righteousness extends to 
group identification, including, as Niebuhr says directly, group identification of whites that has 
led to rejections of the claims of blacks.198
Whether or not we view as adequate Niebuhr’s account of sin–particular the basis for its 
vertical dimension, its universality–two points are worthy of consideration.  First, just as Niebuhr 
argues that we may understand the nature of sin only by understanding the nature of human 
freedom, so he also argues we may understand the nature of human freedom–the ability to act, 
the human “freedom of spirit”199–only by understanding the nature of human sin.200  We recur to 
1921 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 179.
193Id. See also id. at 223 (“The pride which makes itself the source and end of existence subordiates other 
life to its will and despoils it of its rightful inheritance.”).
194Id.
195See id. at 192.
196NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 34.
1971 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 200.
198Reinhold Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist, 24 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 133, 133 (July 6, 
1964) [hereinafter, Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist].
1991 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 96.
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this interrelation when we turn to Niebuhr’s discussion of the possibilities of action.201  Second, 
even if we reject Niebuhr’s theology or ontology, does the experience of sin he describes seem 
accurate or telling?  Whatever its ontological or theological basis, does the experience he 
describes–the interrelation of sin and freedom, the pervasiveness of pride, will-to-power, and 
self-righteousness–seem true?202  This, to me, is the most important question to ask of our 
response to Niebuhr:  does his work capture the lived experience?  In turn, our question is 
whether the lived experience he does capture help us understand what Bell means by the 
permanence of racism:  something at once pervasive and yet also a matter of human
responsibility.
C.  Guilt
Irrespective of whether we accept the ontological or theological dimensions of Niebuhr’s 
portrayal of sin, Niebuhr’s account seems to present a problem on its own terms.  As Niebuhr 
acknowledges, the claim that sin is universal seems to imperil the possibility of social judgment 
and action.  How judge between individuals or between groups if everyone is characterized by 
sin?203  Niebuhr answers by differentiating between sin and guilt.  Guilt represents the actual 
consequences of sin in the historical, horizontal dimension.204  And, Niebuhr argues, although 
200See id. at 17.
201See infra text accompanying notes 210ff.
202See, e.g., GILKEY, supra note 3, at 132-33 (describing how our actions may at once seem conscious and 
so free, and yet at the same time how “experience of ourselves (and especially of others!) shows that these actions 
are themselves pushed, driven, impelled, forced to be more self-concerned, more unjust and insensitive, more 
unloving, than we claim or want to think of ourselves as being.”).
2031 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 220.  See also GILKEY, supra note 3, at 112.
2041 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 220-22.  As Gilkey observes, part of the 
distinctiveness of Niebuhr’s presentation lies in its emphasis on guilt as the historical consequences of sin, rather 
than, as for the earlier tradition, transhistorical consequences, “before God.”  See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 228.
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there may be equality of sin, there is inequality of guilt.205  “[T]hose who hold great economic 
and political power are more guilty of pride against God and of injustice against the weak than 
those who lack power and prestige.”206  The acts of those in power result in a greater number of 
unjust historical consequences.  They are more guilty.207
White men sin against Negroes in Africa and America more than Negroes sin 
against white men.  Wherever the fortunes of nature, the accidents of history or 
even the virtues of the possessors of power, endow an individual or a group with 
power, social prestige, intellectual eminence or moral approval above their 
fellows, there an ego is allowed to expand. . . .  Its horizontal expansion involves 
it in an unjust effort to gain security and prestige at the expense of its fellows.
If we want to pursue justice, we can choose between historical actors and align ourselves with 
those having the least guilt.208
D.  Possibilities of Action
As we come to understand the functioning of power and self-righteousness in the world, 
we recognize the operation of the horizontal dimension of sin in the world and the injustices it 
creates.  Challenge of and resistance to these injustices signifies one real measure of the real 
possibilities of action in this world.  Do we humans have a capacity, though, not just to protest 
the unjust but to determine the just and work toward its behalf?  What is our capacity to know 
and do the good?  In his response to these questions, Niebuhr returns to his juxtaposition of 
205See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 225.  See also GILKEY, supra note 3, at 
112.
2061 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 225.  See also id. at 223.
207See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 113-14.
208See id. at 112.
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freedom and sin and his claim that liberal doctrine had underestimated the capacity of both.209
“Both the majesty and the tragedy of human life exceed the dimension within which modern [i.e. 
liberal] culture seeks to comprehend human existence.”210  It is the human spirit’s “yearning for 
the infinite” that is “the source of both human creativity and human sin.”211  Humans are sinful 
but not solely sinful.  Freedom is the basis of sin, but sin is not the whole of freedom.212  The 
lessons here are several.  First, the fact that sin is not the sum of human existence keeps alive the 
possibility of meaningful earthly action; earthly existence is not simply or solely evil.213  Second, 
this creativity is part of our earthly freedom:  the human capacity for imagination, invention, and 
breakthrough, in issues ranging from the sciences to the arts to government to social relations.214
Third, this creativity and freedom coexist with sin, and the realism of social action must 
confront the capacities for human sin–power, self-righteousness–in human action.  Contrary to 
liberalism, social reform will not occur principally due to “the power of education and moral 
suasion”215 but will require employment of politics and power.216  Niebuhr calls on the use of 
boycotts, for instance.217  Groups in power will not surrender their power voluntarily.  Recall 
Niebuhr’s comment on the prospect for racial reform:  “[T]he white race in America will not 
admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not forced to do so.  Upon that point one may speak with a 
2091 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 24.
210Id. at 122.  See also id. at 124 (“Man is not measured in a dimension sufficiently high or deep to do full 
justice to either his stature or his capacity for both good and evil . . . .”).
211Id. at 122.
212Id. at 17. 
213See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 84. 
214See, e.g., id. at 200.
215 NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 253.
216See, e.g., id. at xxiii.  Recognition of the inextricable role of power in society, instead of the sufficiency 
of moral suasion, is part of the critique of liberalism.  See MANNHEIM, supra note 67, at 225.  
217See id. at 254.
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dogmatism which all history justifies.”218  Niebuhr acknowledges the inevitability in human 
social action of pressure, tension, and conflict.  Acknowledgment of these methods does not and 
should not make them normative, but, Niebuhr adds, “neither will we ease our conscience by 
seeking to escape from involvement in them.  We will know that we cannot purge ourselves of 
the sin and guilt in which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics without also 
disavowing responsibility for the creative possibilities of justice.”219  The creative possibilities 
are ours, and we must accept responsibility for their development.  So doing, though, will also 
require us to act with realism, in recognition both of the use of power by those in positions of 
dominance and of the need for exertions of power in response.
The final element of the human yearning for the infinite brings out the full extent of 
human freedom.  Thus far, the analysis of social realism might suggest that the pursuit of social 
“justice” is simply a matter of power versus power.  Yet missing is a claim of some deeper 
notion of the good that can undergird the claim that action is indeed undertaken on behalf of the 
“just” cause.  And it is this deeper notion of the good that Niebuhr’s theology especially wants to 
articulate.  As Gilkey comments, integral to Niebuhr’s argument is a “dialectic of realistic social 
analysis on the one hand and transcendent grounds for judgment and hope on the other.”220
Niebuhr wants to establish what it means to labor–in this world, realistically, with the ambiguous 
tools necessary–“for higher justice” and will do so “in terms of the experience of justification by 
faith.”221  Faith in a transcendent God,222 a sense of “dependence on an ultimate source of 
218Id. at 253.  For further elaboration of Niebuhr’s assessment of American racism, see infra text 
accompanying notes 346-56.
2192 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
220GILKEY, supra note 3, at 23.
2212 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
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being,”223 provides “a transcendent source of meaning.”224  This transcendent source grounds 
human creativity and freedom225 and at the same time acts as a source of judgment and criticism 
on all human action as to the finitude of its perspective, its errancy, and sin.226  In the face of the 
storms and failures of human existence, including the lack of success in the pursuit of social 
justice, this transcendent source provides an “assurance of meaning,”227 an assurance that 
meaning and goodness do exist both in general and for us each.  It acts as a source of renewal 
and hope228 that provide sustenance for our return to the world of action.229
E.  The Persisting Paradox
Niebuhr has no doubt that the interrelation he describes between the pervasiveness of sin 
and the possibilities of human action–between “fate and freedom”–remains paradoxical.230  And 
Niebuhr recognizes that our tendency would be to reject the paradox precisely because it seems 
nonrational and absurd.231  He asks us to consider, though, the limits of human rationality and to 
be open to the possibility “that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a truth which 
logic cannot contain.”232  This response is, of course, open to at least two objections:  that he has 
not provided a good justification for going beyond reason and that his rationale opens the way to 
222See, e.g., id. at 136.
223Id. at 131.
224GILKEY, supra note 3, at 151.
225See, e.g., id. at 200.
226See, e.g., id. at 17.
227See id. at 54.
228See id. at 18.  See also id. (“a permanent principle of renewal”).
229See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing Niebuhr’s claims of “a confidence in transcendence that supported a 
renewed and restrengthened moral commitment”).
230See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 262.
231Id.
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the propounding of any multiplicity of absurd or paradoxical beliefs.  Niebuhr’s defense is quite 
a simple one:  is not the paradox between sin and freedom that he describes more encompassing 
of the facts of our experience than any non-paradoxical account.  Loyalty must be to “all the 
facts,” to the “complexity in the facts of experience.”233  Think of physicists’ understanding of 
quantum mechanics or of light’s being both a wave and a particle.  The underlying nature of 
either is not clear–indeed seems illogical–yet physicists find quantum mechanics experimentally 
workable and light’s character as wave and particle experimentally verifiable.234  Niebuhr’s 
theology is not experimentally verifiable, but like nuclear physics, grants priority first to 
experience, not the bounds of logic.  Again:  “a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to 
a truth which logic cannot contain.”235
As throughout the discussion of Niebuhr, the effort here is not to assert the truth of the 
ontology or theology that Niebuhr presents.  The concern is much less with the “categories or 
forms” that Niebuhr brings to bear, which are theological in orientation, than with the “content or 
232Id. See also id. at 125 (“Man is thus in the position of being unable to comprehend himself in his full 
stature of freedom without a principle of comprehension which is beyond his comprehension.”).
233Id. at 263.
234See, e.g., BRIAN L. SILVER, THE ASCENT OF SCIENCE (1998) (describing physicists’ understanding of 
light as wave and particle, id. at 393-95, and summarizing the experimental validity of quantum mechanics, id. at 
398-99).  Writing of quantum mechanics, Silver asserts:
It works every time, but it flouts common sense. . . .  How can thousands of scientists use a theory 
that has irrational features to it?  Because where theoretical results can be compared with 
experimental observations, one can only pray that all theories were as reliable.  No scientist would 
dream of stopping using quantum mechanics because he doesn’t understand its foundations.
Id. at 398.  Silver goes on to disparage contemporary efforts to analogize from quantum mechanics to the social 
sciences and humanities, including religion.  Id. at 399-40.  My appropriation of the example of quantum mechanics 
is, I hope, somewhat different.  As the text proceeds to suggest, the point is not to exclude methods of analysis 
simply because we cannot capture within our logic their foundations.
235Id. at 262.
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materials” of this understanding–sin, freedom–which arise from experience.236  Gilkey asserts 
that the “mystery” Niebuhr discusses “is constitutive of real existence . . . and thus is a part of 
our experience.  As a consequence these paradoxes turn out to make more sense of the 
contradictions and puzzles of actual experience (which puzzles also arise from this relation) than 
do the coherent systems that delight the mind.”237  What Gilkey asserts, I ask as a question.  
Whether or not we agree with Niebuhr’s theology or ontology, do we find his understanding of 
human experience “very close to the history we all continue to experience each day”?238  We can 
ask this question of ourselves, and for the purposes of this Article, ask it more precisely of Bell’s 
work, a subject to which I now return.
IV.  Bell, Theology, and Beyond
What are the possible resonances between Niebuhr’s portrayal of human existence and 
Bell’s?  Does Niebuhr’s discussion of the paradox between sin and action help us better to 
understand Bell’s paradox between action and racism’s permanence?
A.  Bell’s Existentialism
An initial question is whether Bell’s work is properly situated within a theological 
framework.  Does the vocabulary of existentialism better capture Bell’s argument?239
Bell does refer several times to the work of the French existentialist, Albert Camus, and 
cites Camus for two basic points.  First, Camus warns that we must proceed “‘with weapons in 




239I later respond to the potential objection that theology and existentialism may be overlapping categories.  
See infra text accompanying notes 271-76.
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our hands and a lump in our throats.’”240 On the one hand, we must go forward; any attempt not 
to act and to remain “pure” will lead to the hurt of others because of our very failure to act.  On 
the other hand, we must act, even though action may well cause injury to those we had hoped to 
assist.241  As we shall return to later, Bell emphasizes the necessity but also the humility of 
action.242  Second, and the point to which I here want to draw much greater attention, Bell also 
refers positively to Camus’s contemporary appropriation of the myth of Sisyphus.  In that myth, 
of course, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to spend every day rolling a rock up a hill, only 
to have the rock fall to the bottom, requiring Sisyphus to begin his labors endlessly yet again.243
For Bell and Camus, what is particularly notable in Sisyphus is his conscious adoption of his 
destiny.  As he turns to go back down the hill and resume his effort, “‘he is superior to his fate.  
He is stronger than his rock.’”244  To similar effect, Bell elsewhere cites Camus as someone who 
maintained the necessity of struggle even though defeat was certain.245  In Camus’s words, “[t]he 
240BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 113 (quoting ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 8 
(Anthony Bower trans., 1978) [Vintage ed.]) [hereinafter CAMUS, THE REBEL].
241BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 113-14 (citing CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, 
at 286-87).
242See infra 316.
243See CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 88-91.
244BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 161 (quoting CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS,
supra note 104, at 89).  A similar quotation appears in Bell, Commencement Address, supra note 143, at 470.  To 
my knowledge, Bell refers to Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus in only one other passage, where his fictional character, 
Geneva Crenshaw, criticizes the story narrator that “there is a Sisyphean element that is missing from your current 
formulation.”  BELL AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 140.
245BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xiv.  In this passage Bell goes on to quote from Albert 
Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 26 (Justin O’Brien trans. 1960) [hereinafter CAMUS, RESISTANCE, 
REBELLION, AND DEATH].  An identical reference to Camus appears in Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra 
note 12, at 584.  On both these pages in Bell’s work, he also cites to a similar end Franz Fanon’s paradoxical 
argument that racist structures are permanent and yet resistance should be maintained, citing Franz Fanon, White 
Skin, Blacks Masks (1967).  I am aware of only two other places in Bell’s corpus where he cites Fanon, both on 
separate propositions than the argument here.  See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 141 (noting 
Fanon’s advocacy of a “spiritual rebirth” through commitment to social revolution); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED, supra note *, at 207 (noting Fanon’s acknowledgment of “the political implication in the black man’s 
attraction for white women”).
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struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart.”246  The struggle may end in 
defeat–the rock will again roll down the hill–but the triumph comes in the struggle itself.247
Meaning derives from engagement and commitment, not the end result.248  We recall Bell’s 
emphasis on action as protest,249 what Camus calls “revolt”250 or “rebellion.”251
Perhaps the most resonant linkage between Camus and Bell surfaces in Camus’s The 
Plague,252 a work that Bell, to my knowledge, does not cite.  In that book, a fictional town is 
overwhelmed with the plague and, to contain the spread of the epidemic, the town is quarantined; 
no one may enter or leave.253  (The book, first published in 1947, is at one level an allegory of 
the Nazi occupation during the years of World War II.)  The inhabitants experience exile, 
deprivation, and great suffering, including innumerable deaths.254  The primary certitudes of the 
novel’s protagonists is, first, that they must face their plight, not shut their eyes to it.255  Second, 
they must fight–fight the plague and save as many as possible from dying and from prolonged 
separation from those outside the town.256  Third, they must fight although victory is never 
lasting:  the plague means “[a] never ending defeat.”257  The plague never dies but at best simply 
246CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 91.
247See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 135.
248BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198.
249See supra section II.B.
250See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 40 (“revolt gives life its value”).
251See, e.g., CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 22 (“In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as 
does the ‘cogito’ in the realm of thought:  it is the first piece of evidence. . . .  I rebel–therefore we exist.”).
252ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1948) (Modern Library ed.) [hereinafter CAMUS, 
THE PLAGUE].
253Id. at 59.





becomes dormant and may arise again.258  Fourth, and most soberingly as Camus extends the 
allegory, the plague is not just a force external to us but one “that each of us has . . . within him; 
no one, no one on earth is free from it.”259  Even those who seek to heal can nevertheless can 
injury.260  The tale to be told, Camus writes:
could not be one of a final victory.  It could be only the record of what had had to 
be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending 
fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, 
by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, 
strive their utmost to be healers.261
The meaning of the plague is “[j]ust life, no more than that.”262  As in Bell, the affliction is 
societally pervasive and seemingly inextricable,263 battle must be waged against the pestilence, 
and the struggle will never be finally victorious.  As Bell’s own appropriation of Camus marks 
directly, Bell’s thesis has a patently Sisyphean, existentialist quality.
And yet Bell’s and Camus’s existentialism also diverge.  Camus engages in rebellion not 
only against human social conditions; his rebellion is ultimately “metaphysical”:  a protest 
against the human condition in an anonymous universe.264  The universe is anomic:  meaning-
less and heart-less, not in the sense of intentionally cruel but indifferent.  The universe is 
258Id. at 278.
259Id. at 229.
260Id. at 227.  This and the prior quotation come from the mouth of Tarrou, a priest.
261Id. at 278.  The quotation comes from the book’s final page.
262Id. at 277.
263I set aside until later the question of whether Bell would ascribe either to himself or other blacks the sin 
of racism.  See infra text accompanying notes 298-325.
264CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 23.
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“divested of illusions and lights,” and humanity finds itself there “an alien, a stranger.”265  The 
condition of humanity, caught between the need for meaning and the “silence of the world,” is 
“absurd.”266  Because the universe has no meaning, the only proper understanding of it is one of 
nihilism.  And yet Camus wants to go on to declare nevertheless that “it is possible to find the 
means to proceed beyond nihilism.”267  The act of rebellion understands the terms of the universe 
but does not accept them; rebellion is an act of defiance.268  Battle must be waged against the 
indifference of the universe and against the human sufferings within it, even if the task is one 
only of reducing the number of evils committed and sufferings undergone, not changing the 
universe’s ultimate meaninglessness.269  “[S]truggle implies a total absence of hope (which has 
nothing to do with despair, a continual rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation), 
and a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature unrest).”270  Human 
action causes no rents in the weave of the universe’s anomic fabric but can still have its own 
integrity and merit.
When Bell, by contrast, finds value in action as protest, the vocabulary he uses is not 
simply existentialist but religious.  Even as he reiterates that protest will likely lead to defeat, he 
talks of it as “a kind of spiritual salvation,”271 it “can bring an inner triumph of the spirit,”272 in it 
265CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 5.  Cf. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Stuart 
Gilbert trans., 1946).
266CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 21.
267Id. at v.  See also CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 302 (section entitled “Beyond Nihilism”).
268See CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 41.
269See CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH supra note 245, at 73.
270CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, at 23.  See also id. at 26 (“the absurd is the contrary of 
hope”) & 67 (“Being deprived of hope is not despairing.”).   When Bell says that Camus sees in the myth of 
Sisyphus courage and liberation “rather than hopelessness,” BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 
161, this must be understood to be a power at the level of human action–its integrity, its limited effectiveness–not at 
the level of some more ultimate meaning.
271Bell, Wanted:  A White Leader, supra note 39, at 541.
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“there is the salvation of spirit, of mind, of soul.”273  In part, Bell’s conviction here is that if we 
cannot control the fate of others, acting with integrity is an effort to take care of our own 
“soul.”274  Yet there is also something more.  Unlike Camus’s existentialism, which expresses 
defiance in the face of what is viewed to be the ultimate meaningless of the world, Bell expresses 
a belief that even if his protest acts in defiance of the realities of the social world, it comports 
with the truths of a more far-reaching world.275  Bell remains existentialist, but as I now turn to 
explore, his existentialism has a more strongly religious component.276
272BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xii.
273BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 177.
274See id. at 63 (“All we have to do in life is save our souls.”) (citing Alice Walker); id. at 154 (citing Tracy 
Chapman’s song “All That You Have is Your Soul”).  In another passage, Bell recounts a conversation with his 
fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, where Crenshaw reminds Bell of a Biblical message, although not exactly so 
told in the Gospels.  The disciple Peter expressed to Jesus his despair that the people would ever understand Jesus’s
message.  “At this point, Jesus put his hand on Peter’s shoulder and said:  ‘Peter.  Save thyself.  The rest are mine.’”  
BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 170-71.
275See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 4 (claiming that his protest actions have “enriched 
my life and provided me with the perhaps unrealistic but no less satisfying sense that I was doing God’s work”).
276Bell’s religious existentialism joins a well-known variant of existentialism, whose major figures include 
the nineteenth century Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, see, e.g., SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND 
TREMBLING/THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (Walter Lowrie trans. 1954) and the twentieth century American 
theologian, Paul Tillich, see, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE (1952).  Niebuhr’s theology can also be 
described as existentialist.  See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 74.  A biographer discusses Niebuhr’s “Sisyphean 
perspective.”  See RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, REINHOLD NIEBUHR:  A BIOGRAPHY 217 (1985).
Although it would take us too far from our main topic to describe in any great detail Camus’s views on 
Christianity that keep his own existentialism relentlessly one of religious critique, a summary of his criticisms is 
relevant both for honing the character of his own existentialist posture and for illustrating how Bell’s religion differs 
from the religion that Camus challenges.  Camus develops at least four overlapping criticisms of Christianity:
1.  He rejects the religious stance that looks for salvation in another, nontemporal world, 
rather than seeking to act in this one.  See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 104, 
at 113 (“[I]f there is a sin against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in 
hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life.”); CAMUS, THE REBEL, 
supra note 240, at 306 (arguing as “the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die, 
and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god.  At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects 
divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE, 
REBELLION AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 73 (“If Christianity is pessimistic as to man, it is 
optimistic as to human destiny.  Well, I can say that, pessimistic as to human destiny, I am 
optimistic as to man.”).
2.  He rejects the religious avowal that any positive mark on humanity comes from God’s 
grace rather than from human action, which Christianity describes as inherently sinful.  See, e.g., 
45
B.  Bell’s Religiosity
It has long been apparent in Bell’s writings that religion has been a signal part of his life 
CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 72 (“I was not the one who said 
that man was incapable of saving himself by his own means and that in the depths of his 
degradation his only hope was in the grace of God.”); CAMUS, THE PLAGUE, supra note 252, at 
116 (arguing that no one believes in an all-powerful God as “proved by the fact that no one ever 
threw himself on Providence completely”).
3.  He rejects the Christian notion of sin.  See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, 
supra note 104, at 30 (observing that for Kierkegaard “sin is what alienates from God.  The 
absurd, which is the metaphysical side of the conscious man, does not lead to God.  Perhaps this 
notion will become clearer if I risk this shocking statement: the absurd is sin without God.”); id. at 
113 (“There are words I have never really understood, such as ‘sin.’”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE, 
REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 73 (“I feel rather as Augustine did before becoming a 
Christian when he said: ‘I tried to find the source of evil and I got nowhere.’”).
4.  Perhaps most profoundly, Camus rejects a God who permits evil and allows deep 
human suffering to occur.  See, e.g., CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 24 (“The 
metaphysical rebel is . . . not definitely [i.e., not necessarily] an atheist, as one might think him, 
but he is inevitably a blasphemer.  Quite simply, he blasphemes primarily in the name of order, 
denouncing God as the father of death and as the supreme outrage.”); id. at 303 (“Even by his 
greatest effort man can only propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world.  But 
the injustice and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they 
will not cease to be an outrage.”); CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, 
at 71 (“I continue to struggle against this universe in which children suffer and die.”); CAMUS, 
THE PLAGUE, supra note 252, at 196-97 (“until my dying day I shall refuse to love a scheme of 
things in which children are put to torture”).  For someone such as Camus writing in the aftermath 
of the Holocaust and World War II, the immediacies of evil and the sufferings and deaths it caused 
were certainly a most stark source of reflection, as those events should continue to be for us all.
In sum, Camus writes that humans must choose between one of two possible worlds:  either “the sacred” or 
“the world of rebellion”; he adds, “[t]he disappearance of one is equivalent to the appearance of the other . . . .”  
CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra note 240, at 21.  This choice between one of two alternatives is one that Bell and 
Niebuhr reject.  Their more detailed rejoinders to Camus I leave largely to the main body of the text, and the 
comparison offered there is indirect.  Let me offer here just three more direct responses.  First, recall that Niebuhr’s 
is a political theology:  he wants to consider how human action is meaningful for ends in this world, not for some 
life beyond.  See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.  Second, Bell cites Tillich positively for the proposition 
that the situation of faith is now (or should be) one where there is no longer “belief in an all-knowing deity” and yet 
a “‘courage of confidence’” can be invoked “under which genuine belief can be sustained despite circumstances 
tending to destroy it.” BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 42 (citing TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE, 
supra).  Third, as we have seen, for both Bell and Niebuhr evil is not something that simply happens to humans or 
something of which they are simply hosts (as they would be of a plague).  They emphasize the volitional character 
of human evil; evil is a human act, something for which humans bear responsibility.  In Niebuhr’s terms, sin is a 
function of human freedom.  See supra text accompanying 185.  It should bear noting that my brief presentation of 
Camus’s views on Christianity and the potential responses to them by Bell and Niebuhr does not attempt to 
adjudicate between these figures.
For more extended engagement with Camus about his response to Christianity, see Albert Camus, The 
Unbeliever and Christians, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 245, at 67.  The quotations above 
from this book come from the pages of this essay.
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and work,277 and this has become increasingly overt in books such as Gospel Choirs278 and 
Ethical Ambition.279  Bell has documented his religious upbringing in the Protestant black 
church280 and his continuing religious faith.281  He describes himself as Christian, but his faith is 
not cabined by traditional Christian doctrine.282  Bell finds Christian literalism to “trivialize the
depths of [the Bible’s] meaning and the universality of its message.”283  The depth of Biblical 
meaning fortifies rather than waters down or destroys belief.  For Bell, “God is there, even if not 
in the form I had long imagined.”284  This faith that takes on the challenges of contemporary 
criticism is one that Bell also locates in Niebuhr.285  Bell’s religiosity is finally something not so 
much a matter of doctrine but something located in the heart:  a deep-seated faith, a core affect, a 
guiding belief.286  Particularly revealing of his faith is Bell’s drawing upon the music and 
message of the spirituals and gospel hymns,287 what he has often called a “theology in song.”288
277See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 145 (“I and other minority teachers are 
encouraged, even inspired in our scholarly pioneering by the Old Testament’s reminder that neither the challenge we 
face nor its difficulty are new.”).  See also Bruce, supra note 132, at 174 (“There has always been an otherworldly or 
spiritual dimension to [Bell’s] writing.”).
278See supra note 20.
279See supra note 96.
280See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 77; BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 
39, at 15.
281See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 75-93 (chapter entitled Evolving Faith); Id. at 88 
(describing some of his continued religious practices).  




286See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 77 (“Just as there are those who are religious but 
have little faith, there are those who claim no religion and yet have concepts of living that define real faith.”).  Bell’s 
faith provides him an “emotional fuel.”  Id.
287See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 78 (noting this reliance).  Bell’s recourse to the 
spirituals and gospel hymns is most overt in Gospel Choirs, a book that could be described as an ode to this music.  
Quotation of the music permeates the text.  See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 1, 4, 17, 27, 28, 29, 49, 60, 
73, 74, 91, 103, 115, 141, 145, 152, 164, 171, 174, 188, 203, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213.
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This music provides a “spiritual nourishment . . . a universality that is capable of touching all 
who hear and needs its comfort, its consolation.”289  The message in the music is one of the 
sustenance that faith provides:  “We’ve come this far by faith.”290  “I don’t believe He brought 
me this far, to leave me.”291  “‘Twas grace that brought me safe thus far;/ And grace will lead me 
home.”292  “There are some things I may not know,/There are some places I can’t go,/But I am 
sure of this one thing/That God is real.”293  A life of faith requires of each individual:  “Keep 
your hand on the plow.  Hold on.”294  Bell’s spirituality295 seems a key to understanding how for 
him human action remains vital and viable despite racism’s permanence.296
288See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 79; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 
252; Derrick Bell, “Here Come de Judge”:  The Role of Faith in Progressive Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 
16 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, “Here Come de Judge”]; Bell, Black History and America’s Future, supra note 21, at 
1191; Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 909.
289BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 3 (writing specifically of gospel music).  See also BELL, 
ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 79 (“The message in the spirituals is universal.”).
290BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 203 (quoting Albert A. Goodson, We’ve Come This Far by 
Faith, in SONGS OF ZION 192 (1981)); id. at 213 & 214 (same).
291BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 60 (quoting James Cleveland, I Don’t Feel No Ways Tired, on
REV. JAMES CLEVELAND:  A TRIBUTE TO THE KING (Malaco Records, MAL 2009 CD), disc 1); id. at 73 (same); 
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 88 (same); Bell, Racial Libel as American Ritual, 36 WASHBURN L.J.
1, 17 (1996) (same).
292BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting John Newton, Amazing Grace, in SONGS OF ZION, 
supra note 290, at 211); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 127 & 128 (same).  Cf. RICHARD DELGADO, 
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES:  CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE 57 (1995) (noting the narrator’s 
comment that Rodrigo should entitle the last section of a paper “Amazing Grace”).
293BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 188 (quoting Kenneth Morris, “Yes, God is Real,” in SONGS OF 
ZION, supra note 290, at 201).
294BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 92 (traditional spiritual); Bell, “Here Come de Judge,”
supra note 288, at 16 (same); Bell, Black History and America’s Future, supra note 21, at 1191 (same).
295Two points deserve attention here.  First is a shift toward spirituality away from religious 
denominationalism or doctrine.  Second, as I shall briefly return to, see infra note 381, this move toward spirituality 
seems one of the significant innovations of critical race theory as a progressive social theory.
296This point is also emphasized by Marcus Bruce:  “[T]o define Bell’s work as primarily a ‘racial critique’ 
is to miss his call for a profound spiritual transformation of American society.”  Bruce, supra note 132, at 167.  
Bruce additionally quotes an interview where Bell says of GOSPEL CHOIRS that it “addresses the ‘spiritual nature of 
life’ and offers gospel music to committed activists as a ‘source of strength’ and a means to develop a ‘faith in 
something beyond our present situation.’”  Id. at 173 (quoting Derrick Bell, The Booklist Interview, BOOKLIST, 
Feb. 15, 1995, at 952).  The dual function in Bell of critique as well as exhortation is integral to what Bruce types 
Bell’s “American Jeremiad.”  Id. at 167.
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C. Bell and Niebuhr
In assessing the possible analogies between the analyses of Bell and Niebuhr, our initial 
question was whether it was proper to place Bell’s work within a theological framework at all.  
Having now a better sense of Bell’s religiosity, we can turn more directly and precisely to the 
potential relevance of Niebuhr for understanding Bell.  To what degree does Niebuhr’s 
discussion of the paradox between sin and action help us better to understand Bell’s paradox 
between action and racism’s permanence?
Bell’s response to Niebuhr’s claim of the universality of sin (sin’s vertical dimension) is 
complex.  In part, as we have just discussed, Bell’s theology is more spiritual than doctrinal, so 
development of theological categories such as sin may not be of particular interest. In part too, 
Bell’s attention is quite evidently directed elsewhere, to what Niebuhr called sin’s horizontal 
dimension, the appearance of evil and injustice in the world.  We return to this point later.297
More generally, Bell’s writings explicitly employ the term “sin” only rarely,298 although he fairly 
Although I can but note the point here, it would be interesting to develop internal to critical race theory 
how different religious backgrounds might act as a relevant variable in understanding different critical stances.  For 
example, recall Bell’s fable of the Space Traders, see BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158.  As 
discussed previously, see supra text accompanying notes 17-21, the narrative avows that whites would trade the 
nation’s blacks to space traders for promised wealth.  By contrast, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have written 
an alternative fable to this chronicle, see Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell’s Chronicle, supra note 21, and in that 
alternative, the outcome is not the dire one that Bell predicts.  The account includes the following statement from a 
religious denomination opposed to the trade:
All men and women are sons and daughters of one God.  We condemn this trade.  As Jesus said, 
“As you did it to one of the least of my brethren, you did it to me.”  This trade would sully a great 
nation.  On judgment day, the Lord will not look kindly on those who voted for it.
Id. at 325 (quoting Matthew 25:40).  My question is whether the religious tradition(s) of Delgado and Stefancic 
differ from Bell’s and whether that difference is a factor in the diverging orientation of the stories.  See also R. 
Randall Rainey, S.J., After We’re Healed:  Imagining a Social Order Based Upon a Justice That Reconciles, 34 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 471 (1990) (criticizing, from a Roman Catholic perspective, Bell’s despairing vision).
297See infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
298The most prominent mention of the term comes in the passage quoted in this Article’s title: racism as “the 
nation’s crucial sin.”  BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 125.  Recall that there the reference was to a 
belief of Ben Goldrich, a protagonist in one of Bell’s fictional chronicles.  Elsewhere in Bell’s texts, the reference to 
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frequently does use the term “evil,” particularly to characterize slavery and racism.299  Bell’s 
invocation of racism as an “evil” may seem unsurprising, but it reinforces his point that racism is 
not something superficial, occasional, or a matter of perception but rather something deep and 
perduring.  Bell excoriates the Brown300 Court, for example, because the reprehensible 
educational segregation that the Court there held unconstitutional “is a manifestation of the evil
of racism the depths and pervasiveness of which this Court fails even to acknowledge, much less 
address and attempt to correct.”301
At the few points where Bell’s work more directly discusses the question of the 
universality of sin, it is typically critical.  In commenting on another legal scholar’s statement 
that imperfection and evil are a heritage shared by all of humanity, Bell remarks: “I have often 
heard similar explanations, and they have never eased either the pain or bitterness of racist 
policies condoned in a nation that boasts endlessly of its equality and justice.”302  Similarly, he 
finds woefully insufficient “confessions of guilt” by those who have engaged in racial 
oppression; these confessions do nothing to solve the real economic problems blacks are 
“sin” is even more anecdotal.  See, e.g., id. at 78 (“I did not want the Senator to get out of paying for all his sins by 
drowning himself.”)(statement by Geneva Crenshaw in a fictional narrative); id. at 139 (the “sin of showing up the 
rest of society”) (statement in the narrative about Ben Goldrich); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 63, at 
1695 (“the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah”). 
299See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 112 (describing how his law school text on race and 
racism treated racial discrimination “as the evil it is rather than a subject . . . examined ‘neutrally’); BELL, AND WE 
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 34 (“evil” of slavery), 37 (same), 41 (same), 42 (“evil of racil discrimination”), 44 
(“evil of racism”), 77 (“racial evils”); Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 185 (“the evil of racism”); Derrick 
Bell, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.’s Legacy, 53 RUTGERS L.J. 627, *** (2001) [hereafter Bell,  Judge 
Higginbotham’s Legacy] (“continuing evils of racism”); Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 543 
(racism as an “evil[] we cannot end”); Bell, Black History and America’s Future, supra note 21, at 1190 (“evils of 
racism”); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 63, at 1693 (the “real evil, racism”); Bell, The Racism is 
Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 586 (racism as an “evil[] we cannot end”); id. at 587 (“evil of racism”); Bell & 
Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 47, at 1612 (“the evils of slavery and segregation”).
300Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
301Bell, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 41, at 185 (emphasis added).
302Derrick Bell, Preaching to the Choir: American as It Might Be, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1032 (1990) (reviewing 
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989)).
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facing.303  For Bell, the claim of sin’s universality becomes a vehicle for acquiescence, 
accommodation, and inaction, and this message must not be accepted.  Niebuhr’s differentiation 
of sin from guilt would agree.304  Elsewhere Bell seems not simply to criticize but to reject the 
universality of sin as applied to racism, in two senses.  First, not every white engages in racism at 
least as an intentional action.  Although all whites do benefit from racism, Bell writes, “I know 
that not all whites are evil or guilty in any normative sense.”305  Second, when Bell rejects black 
responsibility for racism, sin seems not universal but an attribute of power:  “[T]he fact that, as 
victims, we suffer racism’s harm but, as a people, cannot share the responsibility for that harm, 
may be the crucial component in a definition of what it is to be black in America.”306  Yet even 
though these statements appear to take away from Niebuhr’s account of sin as universal, they 
align with Niebuhr in portraying sin and racism as deep structures, something more implacable 
than specific individual actions. They may also suggest an element of universality in the sense of 
the tainted effects of power no matter by whom it is held.  This theme comes across most clearly 
in Bell’s fable The Citadel,307 where we learn only at the end of the story that the oppressive 
power wielded by the rulers was held by those with “dark skins and thick hair” and used against 
303BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 47.  
304See supra section III.C.
305Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 540.  See also BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xvi 
(“not all whites are racist”).
306Id. at 155.  See also Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 39, at 541 (same); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT 
SAVED, supra note *, at 257 (“we find courage in the knowledge that we are not the oppressors . . . .”).  In other 
statements, Bell suggests that blacks bear responsibility to the extent of refusing to adopt a stance of subordinancy.  
See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xi.
307Id. at 61-80.  In his earlier book, Confronting Authority, see supra note 39, Bell presented The Citadel in small 
sections that introduced each chapter.  See id. at 1-3, 9-10, 27-28, 49-50, 67-68, 81-82, 93-94, 101-2, 125-26,145-47, 
165. 
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others, the “lowlanders,” who were “fair-skinned, straight-haired people.”  Further, generations 
before the situation had been reversed.308
Additional suggestive meditations in Bell’s work about the universality of sin appear in 
his reflections on his own activism.  As Bell emphasizes repeatedly, he has been quite constantly 
aware that his own actions may not only end in defeat or in unanticipated consequences but in 
harmful results.  “Each action intended to help some will unintentionally harm or disadvantage 
others who, as a result of our well-intended efforts, will feel–and may well be–less well off.”309
One of the most vivid and poignant examples of this dilemma arose as a result of Bell’s protest 
against Harvard Law School’s failure to hire to its permanent teaching ranks a woman of color.  
As Bell recounts, Regina Austin, an African-American law professor, was then visiting at 
Harvard, and Bell’s actions were interpreted as in part advocacy on behalf of Austin.  Bell had 
not consulted in advance with Austin about his protest, which a number of minority women law 
faculty resented, and Bell acknowledges the view that the publicity and backlash surrounding his 
protest may in fact have eliminated Austin’s ability to gain a permanent position at Harvard and 
added significantly to the pressures Austin had to face that year.310  Bell also grants that despite 
his good intentions, “[i]t is not difficult to find my failure to consider the effect of my protest on 
Regina Austin both selfish and sexist.”311  He as well recognizes that in the eyes of some, his 
308BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note15, at 80; BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 165 
(same).  In the latter work, the excerpt concludes the book.
309BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 7.  See also id. at xii, 185 (same); BELL, AFROLANTICA 
LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 62 (“Our most unselfish work may turn out to do harm as great as the injustices we tried 
to end.”); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198-99 (“our actions . . . may indeed, despite out best 
efforts, be of more help to the system we despise than to the victims of that system whom we are trying to help”); 
Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 47-48 (“What we have to do, black and white who are 
concerned, is to recognize our potential in this society for doing harm even as we seek to do good.”) (question and 
answer session).
310See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 114-19 (relating these events).
311Id. at 116.
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actions may have delayed the hiring of women of color for more years to come.312   Bell defends 
his actions but knows that they also caused pain and may have led to some unwanted 
consequences.313
In other of his work, Bell frequently recurs to a statement made to him by Reverend Peter 
Gomes on Bell’s move in 1980 from Harvard to become a dean at the University of Oregon 
School of Law.  Gomes told Bell that as a dean he would be an evil; he would find himself 
rewarding those he should disappoint and disappointing those he should reward.  The task was to 
become a “necessary evil.”314  As in his comments about his protests, the insight in these 
statements may in part be existentialist: action is necessary but if undertaken may lead to the evil 
of injuring others we had wanted to assist.315  In part the message may also be an insistence on 
humility.316  In part as well the insight may be that in order to act for social justice, tools such as 
312Id. at 118.  Lani Guinier, who became the first African-American woman hired to the permanent Harvard Law 
School faculty, reports that she did reject an invitation to teach at the law school as a visiting professor in 1992, two 
years after Bell’s protest began.  The school was still embroiled in the issue and, she relates, “I was loath to walk 
into the middle of it.”  She finally accepted an offer to teach as a visiting professor during 1996, was soon after 
invited to join the faculty on a permanent basis, and joined the faculty in 1998.  See Nancy Waring, Lani Guinier: 
Present and Visible, available at www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/backissues/spring99/article3.html.  
313See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 114-19.  In these pages, Bell’s comments on his protest 
may sometimes appear defensive.  During the early 1990’s, when I heard Bell introduce a lecture with some 
comments on what had happened to Austin, it was apparent that his uppermost response was one of great sorrow 
about her pain.   
314BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 159-60; BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 139-40; 
Bell, Judge Higginbotham’s Legacy, supra note 299, at **; Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 
36, at 47-48 (question and answer session); Andrea McArdle, An Interview with Derrick Bell, in ZERO TOLERANCE
243, 250 (Andrea McArdle &Tany Erzen eds. 2001) [hereafter McArdle, Interview]; 
315See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 113.  In this paragraph, which precedes his discussion of 
the repercussions of his protest on Regina Austin, Bell quotes Camus’s statement that we must proceed “‘with 
weapons in our hands and a lump in our throats.’” Id.  (citation omitted).  For a prior quotation of this sentence, see 
supra text accompanying note 240.
316See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 155-64 (chapter entitled Humility’s Wisdom); BELL, FACES 
AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198 (same).
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power must necessarily be employed.317  It is unclear whether Bell would say that, as a social 
actor, he must necessarily employ means that are sinful (sin in the horizontal dimension) and 
additionally unclear whether he would also acknowledge that this employment demonstrates 
sinfulness in the vertical dimension as well.  Somewhat suggestive of the latter are statements 
such as: “Power in the hands of the reformer is no less potentially corrupting than in the hands of
the oppressor.”318
One of the areas internal to the black community where Bell has consistently shown 
attention to possible “sinfulness” is in the relationship between black men and black women.319
Bell relates of his own education on this subject:  “For a long time, I thought race and sex were 
separate agendas, but I have slowly come around to agreeing with my women students–white as 
well as black–who have been telling me for years that we blacks must deal with sexism and 
patriarchy in our communities before we can address effectively the continuing evils of 
317See, e.g., McArdle, Interview, supra note 314, at 250 (quoting Bell that the message he tries to convey to students 
is that “[a]s lawyers working in the system they are evil, but with real care and even more real humility, they can 
from time to time be a necessary evil.”).  In a number of other contexts, Bell has surveyed the potential abuse of 
power enabled by the attorney role.  Civil rights attorneys, for example, may have had one goal–integration–while 
their clients had another–equal education.  See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 115.  For a more recent 
comment on this problem, see Bell, Ethical Ambition, supra note 96, at 161.  Bell has also commented on how 
advocacy by civil rights attorneys, including himself, has led more to advancement of their professional careers than 
to improvement in the lives of their clients.  See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 54.
318BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 159 (stated in the context of discussing Gomes’s remark).  See also
BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 7 (“While striving to do the Lord’s work, we will look to many 
of our adversaries and some of our friends like the Devil incarnate.”)  In this quotation, it is unclear whether the 
point here is one only of appearance or of actuality.  More generally, Bell is not sanguine about the abuse of power 
that might occur in any future black-run society.  “A black Camelot is not necessarily what you’d get . . . .  Look at 
Haiti and any number of African countries.”  BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 30.
319This subject has received continuing attention in Bell’s work.  See, e.g., Bell, Women to the Rescue, in GOSPEL 
CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 152-63; The Entitlement, in id. at 188-202 (discussing sexual entitlement therapy); Bell, 
The Race-Charged Relationship of Black Men and Black Women, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 198-
214; Bell, The Sexual Diversion: The Black Man/Black Woman Debate in Context, in SPEAK MY NAME: BLACK 
MEN ON MASCULINITY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 144-54 (Don Belton ed. 1995).  Cf. Bell, Shadow Song, in
GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 91-102 (discussing heterosexism).
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racism.”320  Bell both acknowledges that there is black male chauvinism321 and  insists that the 
problem cannot be reduced to or condoned as a repercussion of the effects of racism on black 
men.  “[O]ne can’t define right by circumstances.  Abuse is abuse.”322  The critique here of black 
male actions is very direct and unremitting.  And Bell has little doubts about the difficulty of 
creating significant change in this context.323  Yet at the same time, Bell does not treat the 
problem as “universal” in the sense of ineluctable, a matter of human nature.  Through education 
and change of will and attitude, black male chauvinism can be reduced.324  The issue again seems 
one more of guilt–sin in the horizontal dimension of the social arena–than of sin in the vertical, 
universal dimension.325
Whatever the final assessment of Bell’s attitude toward the universality of sin, there is 
little question that in his thesis of racism’s permanence he is quite in accord with Niebuhr about 
320BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 154-55.  In some of the conversations with his fictional character, 
Geneva Crenshaw, Bell acknowledges his need for enlightenment on the topic, as in the following response to the 
narrator by Crenshaw: “[S]ome things seem never to change.  White folks want to run everything.  And you want to 
act stupid about women.”  BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note*, at 176.  For similar statements by 
Crenshaw, see, e.g., id. at 69 (“I resent your generalizations about black women.”); id. at 114 (“Thought you would 
taunt me into forgetting my question, did you?  Black woman, emotional–my foot!”).   Bell’s own attitude toward 
black women also arose, of course, in his protest over Harvard Law School’s failure to hire to the faculty any 
women of color.  See supra text accompanying notes 310-13.
321See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 204 (“Black men . . . can be male chauvinists in some of the 
worst ways imaginable, as a whole cadre of black women writers have been reporting to the world for years.”) 
(citation omitted).
322BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 161.  To the charge that many black men are “abusive and macho” 
because under the current economic system they cannot find jobs, Geneva Crenshaw replies: “Such abuse deserves 
excoriation, not defense!”  Id. at 14.  See also id. at 198 (“Blaming racism does no good–though racism has 
undoubtedly contributed to stresses that lead to negative behavior.”).
323See, e.g., id. at 161 (“Seems gettin’ white folks to give up their racist ways may be a piece of cake compared to 
what you’re taking on [i.e., the relationship between black men and black women].”).
324See id. at 156 (“It’s not a question of nature . . . It’s one of mind, of will.  I mean, my own sense of what a man is 
and what he should expect of women has evolved over time.”).
325For Bell the need to stem the corrosive effects of black male chauvinism relate not only to the merits of the 
change on their own terms.  Black women must also be freed from this oppression because “black people must come 
to realize that our greatest strength–our survival hope, if you will–is black women.”  Id. at 154-55.  See also BELL, 
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the manifestation of sin and guilt on the horizontal plane, in the world of action.  Little repetition 
of Bell’s position about the racist nature of social existence is needed here.  As we have seen, 
Bell asserts the need to accept “the dilemmas of committed confrontation with evils we cannot 
end.”326  He is persistent in his claim that those in power insistently believe that their 
“redemption may be gained without surrendering or even acknowledging spoils obtained through 
the most pernicious evil.”327  As for the possibilities of his own action, Bell, like Niebuhr, 
maintains that his faith requires of him work in this world.  A person’s faith must be a “living, 
working faith.”328  One of the most oft-cited Biblical passages in Bell’s work is the following 
from the book of James: “So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.”329 As already noted, Bell 
also accepts, as part of being a “necessary evil,” the need to act for social justice by employment 
of realist tools such as power.
One additional question remains about any possible affinity between Bell’s and 
Niebuhr’s practices in the world of action.  Would Bell resist a relationship with Niebuhr on 
account of the ways in which the latter’s political theology could be applied, including by 
Niebuhr himself?  As we have seen, due to Niebuhr’s account of the universality of sin, Niebuhr 
exempts no social entity or individual from criticism.330   On the other hand, on the horizontal 
plane of social action Niebuhr differentiates between levels of guilt and argues a lesser evil 
AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 46 (reiterating his “belief that black women will ultimately save our 
people”).
326BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198.
327BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 166.
328BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 162.
329BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 13 (quoting James 2:14).  See also BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, 
supra note 15, at 58-59; GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 101; BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 
108; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 44.
330See supra text accompanying notes 177-82.
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should fight against a greater.331  Because of this complex stance, Niebuhr is appealed to as an 
authority by figures across the political spectrum: from progressives criticizing the existing order 
to conservatives defending policies as the lesser of present evils.332  On the horizontal plane of 
his own time, Niebuhr was a cold warrior, strongly anti-communist.333  Niebuhr objected 
strenuously to communism’s “utopianism,” which allowed its leaders to employ any means in 
the short-term for the prospect of reaching the ideal goal.  Communist utopianism failed “to 
acknowledge the perennial moral contradictions on every level of historical advance.”334  The 
question raised back to Niebuhr is whether his realist ethic would ratify, under the guise of being 
the lesser evil, policies such as the use of atomic bombs, the war in Vietnam, or more 
contemporary American foreign policies.335  In part the question is what policies did Niebuhr 
himself endorse,336 in part what did and does his realist ethic permit, regardless of Niebuhr’s own 
beliefs.337  The debate is between those on one side who argue that Christian realism provided 
“‘the religious rationale for the military foreign policy that created the contemporary American 
331See supra text accompanying notes 203-8.
332See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, PROPHETIC FRAGMENTS 144 (1988)(noting the range of political views claiming 
Niebuhr’s legacy); Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. 
REV. 1567, 1567 (1995) (same).
333See, e.g., WEST, supra note 332, at 144 (“[T]here should be little doubt that the Christian realism of Niebuhr led 
him to adopt an exemplary cold war liberal perspective in the post-World War II period.”); RONALD H. STONE, 
PROFESSOR REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A MENTOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 238 (1992)(“The role of Niebuhr in 
leading American liberals to oppose communism is well known.”).
334REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 37-38 (1953).
335See COLM MCKEOGH, THE POLITICAL REALISM OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 150 (1997)(raising the question).
336Niebuhr’s stance on the use of atomic bombs is complex, but he does not offer a blanket condemnation of their 
employment.  See id.   See also Campbell Craig, The New Meaning of Modern War in the Thought of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, 53 J. HIST. IDEAS 687, 691 (1992).  Niebuhr did object to the war in Vietnam.  See STONE, supra note 333, 
at 238; MCKEOGH, supra note 335, at 172n.21 (discussing in detail the development of Niebuhr’s position). 
337The objection raised was that Niebuhr’s ethic would allow acts such as the atomic bombings at the end of World 
War II or the Vietnam War “to be possibly justified (if the evil faced was judged great enough, if the values 
threatened outweighed those sacrificed, if no alternatives were available).  Id. at 150 (describing the objection 
taken).  
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empire’”338 and that it remained “complacent about democratic processes in advanced industrial 
society”339 and those on the other side who maintain it stayed “as critical of the cynicism and 
amorality and conservatism of post-war Realists as it was of the illusions and moralism of pre-
war liberals, pacifists and idealists.”340
We cannot resolve that debate here, but some relevant consequences devolve from the 
very fact of the debate’s continuance.  The debate illustrates the different choices that can be 
drawn from Niebuhr’s political theology and ethic, and that insight is elemental to Niebuhr’s 
realism.   Niebuhr recognizes that religion has been rightly subject to the charge of having a 
“fanatic zeal” and wants to adopt the critique to fanaticism in any form.  Fanaticism itself is the 
“more universal human corruption.”341   Niebuhr warns that humans “are infected by a universal 
inclination to make more of themselves than they thought” and therefore should be “distrustful of 
their own virtue” and “skeptical about their apprehension of the truth.”342  In an insight 
challenging for all historical periods, including our own, Niebuhr admonishes: “The self-
deception of the righteous, whether godly or godlesss, is the chief engine of evil in the world.”343
Just as for Bell, the task Niebuhr sets is one that urges action in the world rather than removal 
from it, that understands that its action may require the use of power to fight other power, but 
338STONE, supra note 333, at 238 (quoting theologian John M. Swomley, Jr.).  See also WEST, supra note 332, at 149 
(arguing that “Christian realists . . . were much concerned with the limits of U.S. power [y]et they could easily 
justify quick and often brutal U.S. military intervention in order to insure the appropriate balance of power”).
339RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 220 (1985).
340MCKEOGH, supra note 335, at 145.  McKeogh continues: “[T]o place Niebuhr within the conservative realist 
orthodoxy would be unwarranted.”  Id.  Accord STONE, supra note 333, at 241-42 (“A sympathetic reading of 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s writing finds him urging a cautious policy of statecraft, the upbuilding of the developing world, 
a nuclear partnership, a decrease in American reliance on military power, outright rejection of U.S. policy in 
Vietnam, and a struggle to criticize and replace the political leadership responsible for it.”).
341REINHOLD NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA 143-44 (1958).
342Id. at 144.  
343Id.  
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also appreciates that its actions must be undertaken as a “necessary evil,”344 with humility, self-
awareness, and self-criticism.   The continuing challenge, of course, is that these stances are 
easier to voice than to implement rigorously in practice, as internal criticism and external 
objection and debate may reveal.345
The most salient place to examine Niebuhr’s application of his method lies in his 
approach to American racism, and let me conclude this inquiry into Niebuhr’s practice by 
amplifying his position here.   As previously noted, Bell cites positively Niebuhr’s insight that 
whites will not grant blacks equal rights as a matter of morality but only if forced to do so.346  It 
is notable that this statement appeared in Niebuhr’s early work Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
which dates to 1932,347 long before the civil rights movement gained national prominence.   
Black civil rights remained an issue of significant attention also in Niebuhr’s later work.  He 
argued there that the disparity in rights and economic success between whites and blacks was not 
simply a vestige of past wrongs but a difference reinforced in our contemporary period.348
White Americans have had “a complacent self-satisfaction” about American democracy,349
344See supra text accompanying note 314.
345Cornel West’s assessment of Niebuhr is suggestive of at least one type of progressive response, one that 
differentiates the merits of a realist method from its specific implementation in Niebuhr’s hands: “Since I believe 
that the religious insights of Christian realism–its sense of the tragic, rejection of perfectionism, and sober historicist 
orientation–are valuable and indispensable, I locate the blindness of Niebuhr and other Christian realists in two 
matters: Europeanist bias and skewed social analysis.”  WEST, supra note 332, at 152. 
346See supra text accompanying note 159.
347See supra note 3.  Prior to joining the professoriate in the late 1920's, Niebuhr had been for thirteen years a 
minister in Detroit, see STONE, supra note 333, at 23, and while there had been “a pioneer on racial issues.”  John C. 
Bennett, Niebuhr’s Ethic: The Later Years, 42 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 91, 95 (April 12, 1982).
348Reinhold Niebuhr, The Negro Minority and Its Fate in a Self-Righteous Nation, 35/59 SOCIAL ACTION/SOCIAL 
PROGRESS 53, 58 (September/October 1968) (combined issue of two different periodicals) [hereinafter Niebuhr, The 
Negro Minority].  Niebuhr does not exempt the churches from this indictment.  “[T]he churches, as Negro Christians 
long ago ruefully admitted, have been the most segregated communities in the South, and for that matter, in the 
nation.”  NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA, supra note 341, at 82.
349Niebuhr, The Negro Minority, supra note 348, at 55.
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believing that our country would solve problems of racial justice over time simply as a matter of 
our “moral idealism.”350  But the effort to provide blacks equal citizenship “was bound to prove 
more difficult than even the most realistic idealists imagined,” for humans remain “unregenerate 
tribalist[s].”351  Because of the stubbornness of these “tribal prejudices,” the struggle for racial 
justice would be long and arduous.352   Niebuhr’s formulation here, of course, recalls Bell’s 
characterization of whiteness as a property right.353  Niebuhr endorsed the civil rights activities 
of Martin Luther King,354 and he urged that it was grossly mistaken for the country to prioritize 
military expense in the “futile war” in Vietnam particularly while at the same time the needs of 
the black community were not being met.355  “After almost two centuries of broken promises and 
pledges our debt to our Negro minority is immense and obvious, and its burden lies heavy upon 
our conscience.”356
After discussing possible points of comparison between Bell and Niebuhr on the 
horizontal plane of social action, one last source of potential resemblance remains, and that lies 
350Id. at 60-61.
351Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist, supra note 198, at 133.
352Id. at 134.  Ronald Stone, a Niebuhr biographer, claims that “Niebuhr’s realism led him to expect ‘slow erosion of 
racial prejudice.’” STONE, supra note 333, at 236 (quoting NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA, supra note 
341, at 82).  This expectation of erosion, even if slow, would seem contrary to Bell’s stance that racism is 
permanent.  It is true that Niebuhr maintained that some prejudices, for example about black “cultural 
backwardness,” would be “cured” by the forms of equal opportunity he saw the courts mandating at the time.  See 
id. at 81.  But the larger phrase from which Stone quotes says: “If we must rely chiefly on the slow erosion of racial 
prejudice . . . .”  Id. at 82.  The point is that change, if it occurs, will be slow, not immediate.  There seems no 
necessary expectation of continued erosion, a hesitation that Niebuhr’s comments elsewhere about the human 
propensity to act as an “unregenerate tribalist” may reinforce.  Admittedly, it is complicated to draw inferences from 
passages written several decades ago in a very different historical period.
353See supra text accompanying note 39.
354See STONE, supra note 333, at 235 (“Niebuhr referred to King as the outstanding Protestant leader of his day, 
white or black.  In Niebuhr’s estimation, King combined idealism and realism appropriately; in Niebuhr, King found 
concepts that made sense of the heartrending struggle of the civil rights movement.”)
355Niebuhr, The Negro Minority, supra note 348, at 64.
356Id.
60
on the vertical plane of their respective faiths.  If Niebuhr finds in his faith a transcendent ground 
of meaning,357 so does Bell.  Bell frequently quotes the following passage from Patricia 
Williams:
“[B]lacks always believed in rights in some larger, mythological sense–as a 
pantheon of possibility.  It is in this sense that blacks believed in rights so much 
and so hard that we gave them life where there was none before; held onto them, 
put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them, not the notion of them; we 
nurtured rights and gave rights life. . . .  This was the story of Phoenix; the 
parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.”358
At first glance, the statement of “an unfertilized hope” appears existential, not religious.359  As 
Bell writes of Williams’ statement, “[O]ur belief in our rights gives them life and thus keeps 
alive our humanity whether or not those rights ever materialize.”360  As we have often seen of 
Bell, the emphasis is on the “committed struggle.”361  The context seems existentialist because 
there is victory regardless whether there is outward success and no matter whether the world–and 
the meaning of the world--is indifferent.  Struggle can bring “an inner triumph of the spirit even 
357See supra text accompanying notes 220-29.
358BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 25 (quoting Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing 
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 56 (Jules Lobel ed. 1988)).  See also BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 176; BELL, 
GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 185-86; Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 900; Bell 
& Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 47, at 1619.  In a subsequent book which draws on her essay, 
Williams’s wording is somewhat changed.  See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163-64 
(1991).
359As it may indeed be for Williams.  Williams writes, “For blacks, the prospect of attaining full rights under law has 
been a fiercely motivational, almost religious, source of hope ever since arrival on these shores.”  Id. at 154 
(emphasis added).
360BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 185-86.
361Id. at 186.
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as, outwardly, one suffers defeat after defeat.”362  Bell argues that blacks possess “the power of 
ourselves.  It is the power of right.  It is the power that comes when we recognize that our 
salvation–not in Heaven, but right here on Earth–comes from a sense of pride in our self-
worth.”363  Racism is permanent, but in action and the unfertilized hope, meaning is there.
Yet for Bell this struggle is ultimately grounded in some deeper sense of meaning.  It is 
Bell’s faith that has provided him sustained nourishment and hope in the face of the frustrations 
of working for social reform.
I have relied on my faith.  Particularly in hard times, my Christian faith provides 
reassurance that is unseen but no less real.  It never fails to give me the fortitude I 
need when opposing injustice despite the almost certain failure of my action to 
persuade those in authority to alter their plans or policies.  For me it is my most 
powerful resource.364
Bell gleans from the spirituals that enslaved ancestors retained a faith, a faith that was their only 
“property.”365  The faith was that “evil and suffering were not the extent of their destiny–or of 
the destiny of those who would follow them.”366  This seems Bell’s faith also.  He relies, he says, 
on what Protestant theologian Paul Tillich has described as “a faith beyond the unbelievable.”367
Despite the permanence of racism and life’s defeats, action and life have meaning, a transcendent 
meaning.  “I am convinced,” Bell writes, “that there is something real out there in America for 
362BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xii.
363BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 24.
364BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 76.
365Derrick Bell, Victims as Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law, in THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 163, 177 (A.E. Dick Howard ed. 1992).
366BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 195.
367BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 96, at 77 (citing Tillich).
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black people.”368   This faith is a power that he knows has been essential for many in the black 
community’s struggle for racial justice, and one that he continues to urge as available and 
necessary to sustain future work.369  In the tension between Bell’s thesis of racism’s permanence 
and his call for continued action, understanding Bell’s faith provides a final key to 
comprehending why this tension is a paradox and not a contradiction.  His faith holds out a hope 
that both hews to Bell’s realism370 and requires humility371 in acting upon it.372
V.  Conclusion
Although Bell seems to maintain some distance from Niebuhr’s understanding of sin’s 
vertical dimension, its universality, he and Niebuhr appear much more to share a sense of the 
operation of sin in the horizontal dimension, in the earthly world of action where social justice is 
sought.  And they share as well a confidence in the transcendence of meaning.  For each, “[b]oth 
368Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 87, at 378; Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 92 (same).
369See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xiii (“The righteous must rely on their faith and 
champion justice even in a seemingly lost cause.”); BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 20, at 11 (“We need a 
foundation for new tactics that speaks directly to today’s crisis, one that also encompasses the vehicles of faith and
steadfastness that have served us so well in past struggles.”); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 196 
(“[Y]ou . . . are looking for a third approach militant enough to meet the reality of our condition and yet humane 
enough to equate with the religious faith that helped sustain us through so many bad times.”).
370See Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 36, at 37 (“[N]either hope nor faith can make the 
impossible real.”).
371See supra text accompanying note 316.  Recall the importance of this humility in Niebuhr also: “[W]e cannot 
purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics . . . .”  2 NIEBUHR, 
NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
372Bell’s approach can then be described as utopian.  See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note *, at 255 
(advocating a “utopian” “Third Way”).  Cf. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 358, at 254 
(discussing the “moral utopianism with which blacks regard rights”).  But it is utopian in the careful sense described 
earlier as the “exploration of the possible,” not as escape or “the completely unrealizable.”  See supra note 149 
(quoting RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 149, at 310).  When this approach retains its 
humility, it also avoids Niebuhr’s criticism of utopian ideologies such as communism, which he argued “fail[ed] to 
acknowledge the perennial moral contradictions on every level of historical advance.”  NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN 
REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 334, at 37-38 (previously quoted supra at text accompanying note 
334).
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the majesty and tragedy of human life”373 far exceed the liberal portrayal of human existence.  
And for each, the interrelation of sin and action or of racism and action remains paradoxical.  
Each seems to suggest, though, “that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a truth 
which logic cannot contain.”374  As throughout, the issue is less one of ontology than of 
experience.  Niebuhr’s portrayal of the experienced interrelation of sin and freedom seems to 
illuminate the experienced interrelation of racism and action.  Diminution of the tension in either 
of these interrelations will fail to capture the veracity of their tensions and of the paradoxical 
experiences they describe.
The lessons Niebuhr and Bell provide are both substantive and methodological.  
Substantively, they contend that human existence is comprised of seemingly deep structures.  
Their assertion of these deep structures challenges certain contemporary norms, particularly 
those that maintain that human values are simply plastic, simply social constructions that are 
nonfoundational, caught within the boundaries of particular cultures.375  The deep structures 
asserted in Bell and Niebuhr–deep structures of good and evil–both break these boundaries and 
contest nonfoundationalism.  Human existence is not simply a “blank slate,”376 with which we 
are free to do as we choose.  One of the great contributions of Bell and the larger project of 
critical race theory of which he is a member is their criticism of nonfoundationalism in law.377
3731 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 122.
374Id. at 262.
375See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).  Mannheim reminds us that the 
presence of these deep structures also challenge liberal ideals: “[T]he deepest driving forces of the liberal ideas of 
the Englightenment lay in the fact that it appealed to the free will and kept alive the feeling of being indeterminate 
and unconditioned.”  MANNHEIM, supra note 67, at 229.
376See STEVEN PINKER, BLANK SLATE:  THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002)(arguing that there are 
biological constraints imposed on human behavior).  My allusion to Pinker does not necessarily presuppose any 
agreement with the biological constraints he proposes.
377As previously intimated, see supra note 296 (discussing Richard Delgado’s and Jean Stefancic’s alternative to 
Bell’s fable of the Space Traders), further elaboration of the varying strands within critical race theory would reveal 
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Against the claim of some in critical legal studies that “rights” are but social constructions that 
society can decide to grant or to take away,378 critical race theory argues that  “rights” 
characterize something more fundamental–a “truth,” a “‘really-out-there’ object[],”379 “a ‘real’ 
reality out there”380–that provides an anchor, something that can be held onto, during the 
storm.381    Methodologically, Bell and Niebuhr argue that it is only through critique–through 
confrontation, rather than avoidance, of the deep structures of human existence–that any real 
possibility of redemption is rendered available.382  This conjunction of critique and a redemptive 
vision is also a dominant thread of critical race theory as a whole.383  Niebuhr and Bell alert us 
that there may be more to “[b]oth the majesty and tragedy of human life”384 than we have 
recently supposed.
differences as to whether racism is “permanent” or instead rather a deep structure within American society as we 
now know it but not necessarily permanent.  
378See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993).
379Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 751 (1994).
380Id. at 753.
381More particularly, while many conservatives have obviously long maintained “spirituality” as an ethos, Bell and 
some trends within critical race theory have helped to revive “spirituality” as a progressive possibility.  For other 
emphases on spirituality within critical race theory, see, e.g., ANTHONY E. COOK, THE LEAST OF THESE: RACE, 
LAW, AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1997).  Cf. DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 292, at 
151 (quoting Rodrigo’s observation that some of the narrator professor’s recent writings “have had almost a–how 
shall I put it–spirituality”).
382I have previously quoted similar sentiments expressed by the hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur.  See supra
text accompanying note 94 & note 94.  This conjunction of critique and restoration of meaning is a hallmark of his 
work.  For example, in the work quoted, Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur confronts whether meaning can survive the 
challenge to consciousness placed on it by the reductive hermeneutic of Freud.
383See, e.g.,  Harris, supra note 379, at 743 (“Despite the difficulty of separating legal reasoning and institutions 
from their racist roots, [critical race theory’s] ultimate vision is redemptive, not deconstructive.”) Bell quotes and 
discusses favorably this passage.  See Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Theory, supra note 18, at 899.   
3841 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 122.
